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ABSTRACT__________________________________________________________  
 
This thesis examines the rules of European company law which regulate the interest conflict 
between shareholders and creditors, i.e. the legal capital rules relating to the raising and the 
maintenance of contributed share capital. This area of company law is at present highly 
relevant and frequently discussed as a result of recent developments. Primarily, the rules on 
capital have come to be questioned and even undermined, as a consequence of the Centros 
case permitting national rules on capital to be circumvented. Although it has been over six 
years since the ruling of the case, the enquiry of legal capital rules is most relevant today. 
Criticism of the rules is constantly being put forward based on arguments of both the Centros 
case, EU goals of a Common Market and the fact that the current regime is held not to 
accomplish the objectives set out for it. In recent years, the debate has flared up even more as 
a consequence of the content of company law and legal capital currently is being under 
review. 
 
As a result of the current European development and debate, this paper asks whether legal 
capital rules can be understood as an efficient instrument to balance the shareholder-creditor 
conflict. Moreover, it asks whether such rules can be objectively justified in the light of the 
freedom of establishment and the realization of an Internal Market. It argues that the current 
regime is unlikely to provide the protection which it has the objective to do, and moreover 
that it not enhances the efficiency of the economic markets. In accordance with the 
recommendations made by the Winter Group to the European Commission, this thesis 
furthermore argues that a new regime is needed if Europe will be able to provide sufficient 
protection of company creditors and sustain the development of the Common EU Market, 
however, not without acknowledging the difficulties that to such changes would imply.  
 
  
                         
Legal Capital, Creditor Protection & Efficiency?                                                      Sandra Ax 
 3
                                                 LIST OF CONTENTS 
 
ABBREVIATIONS____________________________________________________5 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION________________________________________6 
1.1 Presentation of Subject Matter.............................................................................................................. 6 
1.2 Objective & Delimitations...................................................................................................................... 7 
1.3  Method & Material................................................................................................................................. 8 
1.4 Outline ................................................................................................................................................... 10 
CHAPTER 2 CONFLICTING INTERESTS & LEGAL CULTURE_________11 
2.1 The conflict between shareholders and creditors............................................................................... 11 
2.2          Interests and Incentives; the Reason for Legislating ........................................................................ 11 
2.3 Contractual Creditors & Involuntary Creditors ............................................................................... 12 
2.4    Interests of Protection .......................................................................................................................... 13 
2.4.1 The European “Civil Law” Legal Culture......................................................................................... 13 
2.4.2  The Anglo-American “Common Law” Legal Culture ...................................................................... 14 
CHAPTER 3 LEGAL CAPITAL DOCTRINE IN EUROPE_______________ 15 
3.1  Publicly and Privately Held Companies. ............................................................................................ 16 
3.2 Harmonization and the Second Company Law Directive ................................................................. 16 
3.3 Capital Formation Rules in the European Union .............................................................................. 17 
3.3.1 Capital Formation Rules in Germany................................................................................................ 18 
3.3.2 Capital Formation Rules in the UK ................................................................................................... 20 
3.3.3 Final Remarks on European Capital Formation Rules...................................................................... 22 
3.4 Capital Maintenance Regulations ....................................................................................................... 23 
3.4.1 Distribution to Shareholders in Germany .......................................................................................... 24 
3.4.2 Distribution to Shareholders in the UK ............................................................................................. 26 
3.4.3  Final Remarks on the Rules regarding Distribution to Shareholders................................................ 27 
CHAPTER 4 AMERICAN CAPITAL RULES__________________________  29 
4.1 Capital Formation & Shareholder Distributions ............................................................................... 30 
4.2 Protection of Involuntary Creditors.................................................................................................... 31 
 
 
 
Legal Capital, Creditor Protection & Efficiency?                                                      Sandra Ax 
 4
CHAPTER 5 LEGAL CAPITAL RULES IN THE LIGHT OF EU            
GOALS, A COMMON MARKET & ECJ CASE LAW________ 32 
 
5.1 EU Goals of a Common Market & Freedom of Establishment ........................................................ 33 
5.2 The Centros Case.................................................................................................................................. 35 
5.2.1 Facts of the case................................................................................................................................. 35 
5.2.2 Court Reasoning; permission to circumvent national rules............................................................... 36 
5.2.3 Conformity between the Centros Case and European Legal Culture? .............................................. 38 
5.3 The Inspire Art Case ............................................................................................................................ 40 
5.3.1 Facts of the Case................................................................................................................................ 40 
5.3.2 Court Ruling; countermeasures of protection not justifiable............................................................. 41 
5.3.3 No ways of protecting National Legal Capital Rules?....................................................................... 42 
5.4 Potential Developments after Centros & Inspire Art ........................................................................ 43 
CHAPTER 6  RULES ON LEGAL CAPITAL; PROTECTIVE & 
ECONOMICALLY EFFICIENT?_________________________ 45 
6.1 Criticism of Rules on Capital Formation as Creditor Protection..................................................... 45 
6.1.1 Share Capital Requirements as Creditor Protection are Arbitrary & Insufficient …........................ 45 
6.1.2 …and Misleading if Trusted............................................................................................................... 46 
6.2 Criticism of a Balance-Sheet Test as Creditor Protection concerning Shareholder Distributions 47 
6.3 Does Legal Capital Protect Involuntary Creditors? .......................................................................... 48 
6.4  Criticism based on Efficiency & Abuse Arguments........................................................................... 49 
6.4.1 Increased Costs on Society ................................................................................................................ 49 
6.4.2 Bureaucracy and Increased Costs on Companies.............................................................................. 50 
CHAPTER 7 FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL CAPITAL   
REGIME IN EUROPE___________________________________52 
7.1 SLIM and The High Level Group Report .......................................................................................... 52 
7.2 Consultations Revealing Dissatisfaction of the System...................................................................... 53 
7.3 First recommendation; Amendment of the Second Company Law Directive................................. 55 
7.4 Second recommendation; Development of an Alternative Regime .................................................. 56 
7.5 “Action Plan to move Forward”; Where will, where should Europe Go?....................................... 59 
CHAPTER 8  CONCLUSION AND FINAL COMMENTS_________________ 61 
LIST OF REFERENCES______________________________________________64 
 
Legal Capital, Creditor Protection & Efficiency?                                                      Sandra Ax 
 5
ABBREVIATIONS__________________________________________________ 
 
 
AG Aktiegesellschaft 
AktG Aktiengesetz of 1965 
CA Companies Act of 1985 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
EU European Union 
EC European Community 
GmbH Gesellschaften mit beschänkter Haftung 
GmbHG Gestez betreffend die Gesellschaften mit beschänkter Haftung of 1994  
Ltd Limited  
SLIM Simpler Legislation for the Common Market 
UK United Kingdom 
US United States of America 
 
 
Legal Capital, Creditor Protection & Efficiency?                                                      Sandra Ax 
 6
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION_________________________________  
 
1.1 Presentation of Subject Matter  
 
Legal capital rules as an instrument of protecting creditors from shareholder misconduct of a 
company’s capital, emerged in Europe already in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Ever since, rules consisting of capital formation requirements and shareholder distribution 
limitations have been characteristic elements of continental European legislation. It has even 
been held that the fundamental purpose of corporate law in Europe is to protect company 
creditors. This objective is clearly evinced by the fact that most European national legislations 
comprise of comprehensive and detailed statutory regulations on company capital.  
 
During recent years, however, these cornerstone rules of European company law have come 
to be challenged, questioned and harshly criticised from several directions. First of all, the 
legal capital doctrine has been challenged as a consequence the development of the Common 
Market within the EU. More precise, the doctrine has come to be questioned as a consequence 
of some resent rulings from the ECJ in its dealing with companies’ freedom of establishment 
within the Common Market. Although the Court did not directly express its opinion regarding 
legal capital rules and their ability to protect creditors, the consequences of the holdings have 
been held to be devastating with regards to the legal capital doctrine. As a result of the ECJ 
rulings, a debate has started within the Union, asking whether legal capital rules are in 
conformity with the goals of the European Union and whether such rules may still be justified 
with respect to the present development within the Union.  
 
Bearing in mind the ECJ rulings, various scholars and corporate actors have furthermore 
expressed harsh criticism of the legal capital regime, referring to “Anglo-American wisdom” 
and modern economic theory. In accordance with these references, the critics claim that legal 
capital regulations no longer can be justified with regards to either creditor protection or 
business promotion. Some scholars even speak of a “petrification effect”, signifying that 
market developments may turn out to be stronger than statutory requirements and hence 
overrule these rules.  
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Furthermore, in a recent presented examination report, only 25 % of the respondents firmly 
believed in the current regime, while 73 % considered that the same objectives that are 
accomplished through the current system, could be achieved by other means. Based on the 
findings from these consultations, the European Commission last year adopted an action plan 
on modernising European company law, comprising of rather remarkable changes on the area. 
Thus, the current debate has made the issue of legal capital rules highly interesting at the 
moment, and has come to place European company law international in focus. The issue 
whether the cornerstones of European company law are under pressure to change and where 
Europe should go in the future is currently discussed, not only in Europe, but in the entire 
world.  
  
1.2 Objective & Delimitations  
 
As stated, legal capital rules are some of the most fundamental and characteristic corporate 
rules in continental European legislation. The objectives of this thesis are primarily four. 
First, the objective is to present the legal capital doctrine and clarify why we have rules on 
capital and how our European rules differ from the important US regulations. Bearing in mind 
these rules, my second objective is moreover to study recent and present development of 
European company law, primarily with regards to some controversial rulings from the ECJ. 
The consequences of these judgments have been held to have devastating consequences with 
respect to national legal capital rules; why is that, and what exactly are the effects of the 
rulings? Considering the effects of these rulings, is it possible that rules on capital are not 
compatible with the goals of the European Union?  
Taking into consideration the effects of the ECJ rulings above, my third objective is 
furthermore to analyse whether there is a pressure of changing the current regulations. Hence, 
my ambition is to scrutinize the criticism put forward towards the current legal capital regime 
and see if the regime can still be justified, both from the perspective of the recent ECJ rulings, 
but also from a creditor protection and business effectiveness point of view. Accomplishing 
this objective, it is additionally my fourth and last ambition to look ahead and see where the 
ongoing development will take European rules. What role will rules on legal capital play in 
the future, do they even have a future? Where will and where should Europe go in the future?  
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This thesis will merely consider the legal capital rules relating to capital formation and 
shareholder distributions. Under rules on capital formation, aspects of minimum capital 
requirements and contributions in kind will be covered. However, rules relating to post-
formation acquisition and the legal reserve etc. will be disregarded in this thesis. With respect 
to shareholder distributions, merely dividend distributions will be comprised. It must 
nevertheless be noticed, that except from capital formation and shareholder distribution rules 
the legal capital regime comprise of numerous more regulations For instance, rules regarding 
acquisitions of own shares, disbursements in respect of reductions of share capital and even 
liquidation rules. These rules will accordingly fall outside the scope of this essay.  
When the material legal capital legislations are presented under chapter three only the 
national legislations of Germany and the UK will be presented. The reason for presenting 
these two Member States is that they represent the two prevailing theories on capital 
regulation within the EU, which the remaining states have based their national rules on.    
With respect to the ECJ case law, only two rulings will be presented; The Centros and 
Inspire Art case. There are, however, several rulings which also concern the subject matter 
dealt with, but these will due to the page limit have to be disregarded under the scope of this 
thesis. Furthermore, the cases presented will merely be dealt with from the perspective of 
legal capital rules. The decisions have in contemporary legal writing been extensively 
analysed from the perspective of conflicting national company regulation, i.e. the conflict 
between the real seat principle and the incorporation principle. This aspect will, however, not 
be considered in this thesis.   
 
1.3  Method & Material  
 
This thesis is a traditional desk study where descriptive and analytical, as well as comparative 
method has been used. The basic understanding of the subject has been received by primarily 
reading technical books dealing with legal capital rules in Europe from several perspectives. 
Based on this received knowledge a traditional source of law description method has been 
used when presenting the material rules. The additional and deeper understanding with respect 
to the present development and its implications has further been attained through the study of 
various European and American articles, and furthermore material from the European 
Commission concerning the current development and present ongoing debate. Based on this 
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understanding and knowledge I have focused on describing, analysing and scrutinizing the 
specific problems that are the objective and ambitions of this thesis. 
     The descriptive part of the material rules aim at being as comprehensive as the page limit 
provide for, and hereby supplying the reader with a sufficient ground for the following 
analytical parts. Mainly, an argumentative approach has been applied when writing, but in 
various parts also a more critical approach has been applied. The analytic parts contain legal 
as well as economic arguments. Furthermore, the analysis contains comparisons with Anglo-
American Common Law, focused on US regulations. The objective of this comparison is 
dual; first, they will illustrate the main differences between the European and the US system 
and thereby provide the reader a deeper understanding of the current European regime, and its 
benefits and possible shortcomings. Second, the comparison will serve as a reference system 
when considering potential developments of the current European model.   
 
Since legal capital regulations are cornerstones in European corporate legislation there is 
hence much material with regards to material regulations. To present the essence of these 
material regulations, professional literature, national statutes, EU Directives and various EU 
publications have been studied. The material scrutinized derived from both European and 
American legislations and have moreover been authored by various well-reputed scholars. 
Concerning the more specific issues seeking to problemize the issues analysed with respect 
to legal capital rules, mostly legal writing in articles and reports have been studied. Moreover, 
also rulings from the ECJ have been studied. To explain these decisions, and also to analyse 
the consequences of the outcomes, various articles commenting on the rulings have been 
examined. The final chapter regarding the future of the European legal capital regime is 
principally founded on material from the European Commission. This material has almost 
exclusively been received from the website of the European Commission, see the list of 
references.  
Hence, this thesis is principally based on material achieved after extensive research in 
various databases. This material primarily consists of articles and presentations written by 
various authors, lawyers and company law experts. All material that has been used is up to 
date and published by respected legal scholars in respected law journals and journals from 
prominent universities, see the list of references.  
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1.4 Outline 
 
This thesis is implicitly divided into two parts. The first part comprises of chapter 2-4 and is 
mainly descriptive. Chapter two starts of with presenting the underlying conflict which this 
thesis is based on, the conflict between shareholders and creditors within a company. This 
chapter is meant to provide the fundamental understanding of why there are rules on capital 
and moreover to illustrate how legal cultures reflect values and priorities within a society. 
Based on this understanding, chapter three will thereafter present the material regulations of 
Europe and the EU with regards to capital formation and capital maintenance rules. Following 
this chapter, chapter four will provide a brief overview of the Common Law tradition, 
illustrated by American regulations. This chapter only comprises the main features of the 
relevant US rules, and will mainly serve a comparative function to contrast the European 
regulations to the American ones in balancing the shareholder-creditor conflict.  
 
The second part, chapter five, six and seven, comprise the analytical part of the thesis and is 
based on the previous descriptive chapters. Chapter five can be held to be the central chapter, 
and deals with the European legal capital rules in the perspective of the EU’s goal of a 
Common Market. The chapter will display how two recent rulings from the European Court 
of Justice, the Centros and the Inspire Art case, have come to challenge and question the 
whole legal capital regime. Initially, the two cases will be presented and hereafter a discussion 
will follow of the consequences of these rulings. From the perspective of the Centros and 
Inspire Art cases, the following chapter, chapter six, asks whether the European legal Capital 
regime may still be justified considering the previous rulings, and the harsh critique put 
forward towards the current system. The chapter focuses on criticism regarding rules on 
capital formation, shareholder distribution through a balance-sheet test, protection of 
involuntary creditors and criticism based on efficiency and abuse arguments. Bearing in mind 
the harsh critique presented, chapter seven hereafter considers the future of the legal capital 
regime in Europe. The chapter is mainly based on a recent report from a respected group of 
company law experts, which by direction of the European Commission have presented several 
recommendations for a modernising company law in Europe. These recommendations will be 
scrutinized and commented on. Finally, a vision of the future will conclude the chapter by 
considering where Europe will and should Europe go. Last, the thesis will be rounded off in 
chapter eight with a conclusion and some final remarks.   
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CHAPTER 2 CONFLICTING INTERESTS & LEGAL CULTURE___ 
 
 2.1 The conflict between shareholders and creditors 
 
Within a corporation there are many groups of actors, as for example, majority shareholders, 
minority shareholders, management, employees and creditors. These groups all have various 
interests in a corporation’s cash flow, and these interests inevitably come into conflict. 1 This 
thesis is based on one of these conflicts, the conflict between shareholders and creditors. 
The origin of the shareholder–creditor conflict arises as a consequence of the fact that 
shareholders in corporations are not held personally responsible for the debts of the company. 
The members and the investors in a corporation are not liable for more money than the 
amount they invested in the company.2 Consequently, all persons that may have claims on a 
company’s capital, the creditors, are restricted to the assets of the company.3 This 
characteristic is usually justified by the fact that ordinary persons would not be willing to start 
up companies if they risked being personally responsible for debts that the corporation may 
incur. Notwithstanding the advantage of corporations for society, the benefit of limited 
liability does not eliminate the risk of business failure. Limited liability simply shifts the risk 
from the shareholders to the creditors4. While shareholders have an interest in obtaining yield 
of the money they have invested in the company, creditors have an interest in the corporation 
having enough capital to pay its debts. Accordingly, there is a conflict between shareholders 
and creditors regarding the usage of a company’s capital.5  
  
2.2                 Interests and Incentives; the Reason for Legislating 
  
A limited liability corporation is based on the notion of making profit to its shareholders. 
However, since shareholders are not held personal liable for debts of the company, 
shareholders in companies with heavy debts often have strong incentives to act 
opportunistically. These opportunistically actions regularly occur at the expense of existing 
                                                 
1 Bergström– Aktiebolagets grundproblem, p.28-29.  
2 Werlauff – EC Company Law, p. 23.  
3 Bergström– Aktiebolagets grundproblem, p.188  
4 Van der Elst– Economic Analysis of Corporate Law in Europe: an Introduction, p.7 
5 Enriques & Mecey - Creditors versus Capital Formation: the Case against the European Legal Capital Rules, p. 
4-5.    
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creditors since the result is that company assets are reduced.6 The temptation of making more 
profit is moreover held to increase the risk-taking. If there is a slight chance of increasing the 
value of equity, the chance will often be taken, often at the risk and the expense of the 
creditors.7 The result is thus that the limited liability may create incentives for shareholders to, 
for example, invest in projects that are riskier than planed when the creditors extended the 
credit.8  
Furthermore, shareholders interest in obtaining profit may create incentives to engage in 
asset diversion from the creditors to themselves.9 This diversion may, for example, take place 
in forms of dividend payments to the shareholders, payment of expensive salaries etc. All of 
these distributions will, naturally, reduce the capital upon which creditors depend when they 
extend credit to a company.10 Furthermore, shareholders, or managers, may engage in claim 
dilution and in this way affect the financial stability of the company. This situation may, for 
example, arise if the shareholders increase debt leverage by taking another loan at the same or 
a higher priority than the old debts. Creditors may also be affected negatively by shareholder 
behaviour if assets are purchased which is connected to a better safety right.  The result is the 
elimination of the advantage that the existing creditors have connected to their claims, if the 
company becomes insolvent.11 The reason for having legislations on the area is accordingly to 
prevent misconduct and create a balance in these presented situations.  
 
2.3 Contractual Creditors & Involuntary Creditors 
 
Creditors as a group comprise of a wide range of actors and may primarily be divided into 
contractual creditors and non-contractual creditors. Contractual creditors are those creditors 
who contract with company and in this way their claim towards the company arises. The 
major contract creditors are banks and other finance houses, but also different suppliers 
extend credit when supplying products, rents and electricity.12  
                                                 
6 Bergström – Aktiebolagets grundproblem, p.190 
7 Bergström – Aktiebolagets grundproblem, s.191 
8 Enriques & Mecey – Creditors versus Capital Formation: The Case against the European Legal Capital Rules, 
p. 2-3 
9 Bergström – Aktiebolagets grundproblem, p.191. 
10 Enriques & Mecey – Creditors versus Capital Formation: The Case against the European Legal Capital Rules, 
p. 2.  
11 Bergström – Aktiebolagets grundproblem, p.192 and Enriques & Mecey - Creditors versus Capital Formation: 
The Case against the European Legal Capital Rules, p. 2 
12 Rhode – Aktiebolagsrätt, p. 21 
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Non-contractual, or involuntary, creditors on the other hand, do not have the possibility of 
contracting with the company. One examples constitute of tort victims, who receive claims 
towards the company after being hurt by the company in any way and thus has the right to 
damages, for instance under environmental law.13 Other involuntary creditors are employees 
and the public as tax and VAT collector. All these creditors have no possibility of protecting 
their interests alone and they are therefore dependent on other mechanisms that will secure 
that the company covers their claim.14  
 
2.4    Interests of Protection  
 
As illustrated in the previous paragraphs, the opposite interests in the present conflict are, on 
one side, shareholders´ freedom of action regarding the company capital, and on the other 
side, creditors’ interest of keeping the same capital in the company. Which of these actors and 
interests that is regarded more meriting protecting, have been regarded differently in different 
legislations. In other words, the extent to which creditors are protected by law varies among 
national legal systems, and reflects the values and exceptionalisms of each society.  
 
2.4.1 The European “Civil Law” Legal Culture 
Under European Civil Law tradition, creditors have always been benefices of a strong 
legislative protection from shareholders interests. The interest of protecting creditors in 
company law goes back a long time and is by now deeply rooted in the European culture.15 
Some scholars have even held that one of the fundamental purposes of corporate law in 
Europe is to protect creditors.16 The reason for this position has always been the fear that 
creditors would not invest in companies if they were not protected by shareholder misconduct 
and guaranteed a certain amount of assets if the company went bankrupt.17 Thus, the security 
of creditors is held to be equal to the capital of the company, and therefore the European 
starting-point is that the company capital must be controlled. As a result, shareholders´ 
freedom of action will be restricted with several rules aiming to protect the company capital. 
                                                 
13 Kübler, – The Rule on Capital under the Pressure of the Securities Markets, p. 9. 
14 Rhode – Aktiebolagsrätt, p. 21 
15 Hopt – Modern Company Law problems; A European Perspective, Keynote speech, p. 6 and  Kübler, – The 
Rule on Capital under the Pressure of the Securities markets, p. 1. 
16 Enriques & Mecey - Creditors versus Capital Formation: the Case against the European Legal Capital Rules, p. 
4-5. 
17 Rodhe – Aktiebolagsrätt, p. 21. 
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These rues are called legal capital rules, and the compliance with these rules can be seen as 
the trade off for shareholders to obtain the benefits of limited liability.18 Consequently, legal 
capital rules are the protectors of both contractual and involuntary creditors in Europe.19 Some 
national European legislations, and also EU regulations, based on this tradition will be 
presented under chapter 3.  
From the heading of this subsection it was stated that the legal culture presented concerns 
European Civil Law countries. However, with regards to the UK which de facto is a European 
state, the situation is more complex. Britain namely has a Common Law tradition and as a 
result the British legal tradition differs widely from the rest of Europe.20 Hence, what is stated 
in the next subsection will in many aspects be more correct concerning the UK tradition. This 
“dual” position of the UK will be further illustrated under part 3.3.2 and 3.4.2 where the 
material rules of the country are presented.  
 
2.4.2  The Anglo-American “Common Law” Legal Culture 
The legal culture in Common Law systems, as for example the US and to a certain extent in 
the UK, is nearly the opposite compared to the European tradition of statutory creditor 
protection. The Anglo-American system is instead based on values of individualism, equal 
rights and opportunities are upheld, not equal results or conditions. As a result market forces 
are often let to run freely with merely a modest involvement of government and legislation.21 
The fundamental purpose of existing corporate law is accordingly to provide the utmost 
flexibility for private ordering within a structure that seeks to maximize value for 
shareholders.22 Creditors are seen as individuals, and not a homogenous group, resulting in 
that creditors who wish to protect themselves from shareholders behaving opportunistically, 
must do so by contract based on credit references etc.23 The starting-point under Anglo-
American Common Law tradition, is thus that creditors participate in corporate governance at 
their peril.24 
                                                 
18 Kübler, – The Rule on Capital under the Pressure of the Securities Markets, p. 1.   
19 Rodhe – Aktiebolagsrätt, p. 21 and Enriques & Mecey - Creditors versus Capital Formation: the Case against 
the European Legal Capital Rules, p. 4-5. 
20 Kübler, – The Rule on Capital under the Pressure of the Securities Markets, p. 3.   
21 Chase – American “Exceptionalism” and Comparative Procedure, p. 1. 
22 Enriques & Mecey - Creditors versus Capital Formation: the Case against the European Legal Capital Rules, p. 
5. 
23 Enriques & Mecey – Creditors versus Capital Formation: The Case against the European Legal Capital Rules, 
p. 5.  
24 Enriques & Mecey – Creditors versus Capital Formation: The Case against the European Legal Capital Rules, 
p. 4-5.  
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Also with regards to involuntary creditors, statutory legal capital rules are rejected. The 
argument is that such rules do not consider the individual situation of each company in 
relation to its business activity; hence they cannot provide any meaningful protection to 
creditors.25 However, because involuntary creditors are not able to create protection through 
contracts, other means of protection have been created. First of all, there is a system of 
disregarding the corporate entity and the limited liability, and thereby raise claims directly 
against the shareholders under what is called the doctrine of “piercing the corporate veil”.26  
Second, corporations are also obliged to take out mandatory insurances that will cover the 
claims of these creditors.27 
 
This chapter has pointed out the conflict between shareholders and creditors, and two ways of 
balancing the interests within the conflict has been presented. In Civil Law Europe the side is 
clearly taken for creditors and comprehensive sets of rules have been developed to protect 
these actors as a group. In Common Law systems as the US, on the other hand, focus lies on 
individual flexibility for both shareholders and creditors. Bearing in mind this chapter as a 
background, the next two chapters will look further into, mainly the European, material 
regulations that are based on these legal traditions and values.  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 LEGAL CAPITAL DOCTRINE IN EUROPE__________  
 
Rules on capital of companies emerged in Europe in the 2nd half of the 19th century and are, as 
been stated, generally viewed as a reaction to the separation of liability.28 Today all of the EU 
Member States, more or less, adhere to the legal capital doctrine. In most states the rules on 
capital are considered cornerstones and various company and closely related regulations are 
built up around these rules. However, in a few states rules on capital have no tradition, but 
have been imposed by the EU through its endeavour of harmonising national company 
legislation within the Member States. The objective of this chapter is thus to present and 
explain the legal capital rules in Europe and how it has been affected by the EU 
                                                 
25 Kübler - The Rules on Capital under the Pressure of the Securities Markets, p. 3-4.  
26 Miller – Piercing the Corporate Veil among Affiliated Companies in the European Community and in the US: 
A Comparative Analysis of US, German and UK Veilpiercing Approaches, p.3. 
27Kübler - The Rules on Capital under the Pressure of the Securities Markets, p. 8.  
28 Kübler - The Rules on Capital under the Pressure of the Securities Markets, p. 1. 
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harmonisation work. Before beginning with this presentation, an important distinction of 
company forms must be made. 
 
3.1  Publicly and Privately Held Companies.  
 
Within most states of the EU there are two forms of limited-liability companies, one public 
form29 and one private form30. The main difference between the two is that only the public 
form may issue shares to the public for procurement of capital.31 Moreover, and irrespective 
of this difference, the distinction between the two forms is highly important since only 
publicly held companies are comprised by the harmonization work of the EU, see part 3.1. As 
a result, all publicly held European companies are regulated by similar national regulations 
since they all are subject under the same minimum regulations.32  
Contrarily, with respect to privately held companies, there are no EU rules, or any other 
guidelines for that matter, that Member States must oblige to. Regulations concerning 
privately held companies are thus entirely the task of each national Parliament. As a 
consequence, European private corporate legislations have been divided into two camps or 
models; one model which may be considered traditional European with the origin in German 
legislation, and one model based British legislation and tradition. To display this division of 
Europe, which will be of importance later in this thesis, the German legal capital legislation 
(representing states as for example France, Italy, Spain, Austria, and the Scandinavian 
countries), and the UK capital legislation (representing mostly Ireland) will be presented with 
regards to both public and private companies, see part 3.3 and 3.4.  
 
3.2 Harmonization and the Second Company Law Directive  
 
Already in the 1960´s, a harmonization work started within the EU which over the years has 
become more and more comprehensive. The harmonization of national company law has been 
accomplished through Directives which oblige the Member States to adjust their national 
                                                 
29 Examples of public company forms are: Germany- the Aktiengesellschaft (AG), the UK – public Ltd, France 
– Societ e´ Anonyme (SA), Italy –Societ a´ per azioni (spa), Spain Sociedad Anonima (SA).  
30 Examples of private company forms are: Germany- the Gesellschaft mit beschänker Haftung (GmbH), the UK 
– private Ltd, France – Societ a´ Responsabilité Limitée (SARL), Italy –Societ a´ responsebilita limitata (srl), 
Spain Sociedad Limitada. 
31 Rodhe – Aktiebolagsrätt, p. 22.  
32 See Article 1, Second Company Law Directive.  
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legislation to the requirements of these directives.33 At this point, ten Company Law 
Directives have been adopted34, and one of those is the Second Company Law Directive 
(77/91/EEG) adopted on the 13th December 1976. This directive, which is called “The Capital 
Directive”, deals with the formation of public35 limited liability companies and the 
maintenance and alteration of their capital.36  
The Directive is clearly characterised by traditional Civil Law tradition and values. The 
preamble, for example, states that the provisions of legal capital regulation in the Directive 
should be adopted for the maintenance of a company’s capital since this capital constitutes 
creditors' security.37 In accordance with this objective, the material regulations of the Second 
Directive are built up around two tiers and the rules may thus be distinguished by their 
purpose relating to these tiers; either they relate to (1) the raising of capital which will 
guarantee that a certain capital is contributed to the corporation before the company is 
incorporated, see part 3.1, or (2) the rules have been enacted in order to ensure that capital is 
maintained in the company after incorporation, see part 3.2. This second tier thus complete 
the first tier, by providing regulations that will prohibit return of the initial contributions to the 
shareholder during the company’s life.38 Accordingly, the underlying thought of these rules is, 
in conformity with the European culture, that there always should be a “cushion” in the 
company39 which will protect both contractual creditors and involuntary creditors.40  
The following presentation of, both public and private, European legal capital regulations 
will follow the above division and the regulations of the Second Directive.  
 
3.3 Capital Formation Rules in the European Union 
 
With regards to public companies, the first tier of the Second Directive deals with the raising 
of company capital through a minimum share capital requirement. Article 6 of the Directive 
                                                 
33 SOU 1997:168, p. 49 The legal base for harmonization is Article 44 (2 ) g, Treaty of Rome. Fourteen 
Directives have been issues of which however four (the 5th Directive concerning corporate governance, 9th 
Directive regarding groups of companies, the 10th Directive on mergers or the 14th Directive on transfer of the 
registered seat while retaining the legal personality) have not been adopted yet. 
34 Werlauff – EC Company Law, p. 46.  
35 Article 1 (1) Second Directive. Whether a company is public or not, must be evident from the name of such 
company.  
36 Edward – EC Company Law (1999), p. 51-52.  
37 See the preamble of the Second Company Law Directive.  
38 Enriques & Mecey – Creditors versus Capital Formation: The Case against the European Legal Capital Rules, 
p. 5. 
39 Bergström – Aktiebolagets grundproblem, p.190 
40 Andersson – Kapitalskyddet i Aktiebolag, s. 9 
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thus obliges Member States to pass laws requiring public companies to have a minimum share 
capital of at least 25,000 European Units, i.e. euro, before they may commence business.41 In 
addition, Article 7 moreover states that this subscribed capital only may consist of “assets 
capable of economic assessment”.42  
Furthermore, it is possible for shareholders to pay their shares by other means than cash. 
This type of payment is called contribution (or payment) in kind and may constitute of for 
example real property, single pieces of machinery, a patent or a complete undertaking.43 In 
these situations, it has been regarded important to guarantee that the assets contributed have 
the value that has been assigned to them, since an overvaluation clearly would be a 
disadvantage of the creditors, and moreover that these assets indeed are assigned to the 
company. As a result, Article 10 of the Second Directive prescribes that in cases where 
contributions are made in kind, an independent exert44 appointed or approved by an 
administrative or judicial authority, must prepare a special report which will be subject to 
disclosure.45 At minimum the expert’s report must (1) describe the asset, (2) describe the 
valuation method and (3) state whether the value of the assets corresponds to the value of the 
shares that the shareholder receives.46 As a consequence of this strictly formal procedure, 
Member States may not permit undertakings to perform work or supply services to form part 
of assets constituting contributions in kind.47 Moreover, Article 9, prescribe that shares issued 
for a consideration must be paid up at the time the company is incorporated, by not less than 
25 % of their nominal value.48 
 
3.3.1 Capital Formation Rules in Germany 
As been stated, most European legal capital legislations have their origin in German corporate 
tradition. In general, the German, and the continental European, corporate legislation is 
characterized by detailed and mandatory provisions with a long tradition of protecting 
creditors. In Germany this tradition is based on the idea that a company is “something more” 
                                                 
41 The amount of the minimum capital shall moreover be revised every five years by the Council, with regards to 
the economic and monetary trends in the Community see Article 6 (2) of the Second Company Law Directive. 
See also Dorresteijn – European Corporate Law (1995), p. 41 and Edwards – EC Company Law, p. 60.  
42 Dorresteijn– European Corporate Law (1995), p. 41. 
43 Werlauff – EC Company Law, p. 114 and Edwards– EC Company Law, p. 62-64.  
44 Persons who act as independent experts can be either natural or legal persons, according to the provisions of 
each Member State.  
45 Edwards – EC Company Law, p. 62. 
46 Werlauff – EC Company Law, p. 114. 
47 See Article 7 second sentence.   
48 Edwards – EC Company Law, p. 61. 
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than just a contract between the shareholders. Companies are regarded to have a responsibility 
towards the society and everyone that engages in the company’s activity which, for example, 
is reflected in the fact that major creditors as banks have seats in the supervisory board, 
Aufsichtrat.49  
The German public limited liability company, Aktiengesellschaft (AG)50, is subject to the 
Second Directive and is thus required to have a minimum start capital of 25,000 euro. Article 
7 of the Stock Corporation Act (Aktiegesetz: AktG), however, prescribe that the double 
amount, at least 50,000 euro must be submitted.51 Furthermore, the amount of the share 
capital must always be stipulated in the articles of association. Prior to registration all shares 
must be subscribed to, and at least one-fourth, 25 per cent, of the nominal value amount of the 
cash contributions must have been paid-in.52  
In addition to traditional cash payment shareholders may also pay their part of the share 
capital with other means. In accordance with Article 10 of the Second Directive it is therefore, 
it is also possible under Article 27 § AktG to make contributions in kind, as long as the assets 
contributed comprise of assets which have an “ascertainable economic value”.53 This 
economic value must moreover be certified in an independent expert report made by 
independent experts, which in Germany is appointed by the court.54 Moreover, according to 
Article 36a AktG, all contributions in kind must be made in full prior to registration which 
thus is a stricter provision than what is required by the Directive.55 However, if the 
contributions in kind consist of an obligation to transfer assets to the company, such 
obligation must be capable of being fulfilled within five years after registration in the 
company register. In accordance with the Second Directive, undertakings to provide services 
are explicitly prohibited.56  
 
Turning to the regulations of the private limited liability companies, there are, as been said, 
no requirements for the Member States to oblige to. Generally, private companies in Europe 
                                                 
49 Hopt – Modern Company Law problems; a European Perspective, Keynote Speech, p. 6.  
50 The public company  Aktiengesellschaft (AG) is regulated in the Aktiengesetz (AktG). In total there are about 
3000 AG in Germany, see  SOU 1997:168 p.51. 
51 Dorresteijn – European Corporate Law, p. 72.  
52 Maitland-Walker– Guide to European Company Laws, p. 158 and Dorresteijn– European Corporate Law, p. 
73.  
53 Dorresteijn – European Corporate Law, p. 72-73. The authors of the book state that only in rare cases the 
contributions take the form of cash and that in most cases the issue of shares is based on non-cash contributions 
such as the conversion of an existing business.    
54Article 33 paragraph 3 AktG, see also Kübler – The Rule on Capital under the Pressure of the Securities 
Markets, p. 1. 
55 Maitland-Walker – Guide to European Company Laws, p. 158. 
56 Dorresteijn – European Corporate Law, p. 72.   
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offer more flexibility and rules which may be considered more lax with respect to legal 
capital. However, all Member States except the UK and Ireland, see below, require a 
minimum capital before incorporating. The German private limited-liability company, 
Gesellschaft mit beschänker Haftung (GmbH)57, for example, require a minimum share 
capital to be submitted of at least 25,000 euro. Furthermore, the amount of the original 
contribution of each shareholder must be at least 100 euro in total, according to Article 5 (1) 
GmbHG, and at least one-quarter of each original contribution must be paid in before 
registration.58  
When contributions are to be made in kind, the assets comprising the contributions, and the 
amount of the original contribution that they are to cover, must be stated in the articles of 
association, see Article 5 (4) GmbHG.59 Shareholders must moreover set out in a report, the 
major considerations supporting the appropriateness of the valuation of the non-cash 
contributions which has to be reviewed by the local court of registration60. In situations when 
a business is transferred to the company, the results of this business activity of at least two 
financial years must be stated in the report. If, at the time of the application for registration, 
the value of a contribution in kind does not equal the amount of the original contribution 
subscribed for, the shareholder must make cash contribution in the amount of the shortfall, 
according to Article 9 GmbHG.61    
 
3.3.2 Capital Formation Rules in the UK  
Following a Common Law culture, Britain has a tradition of viewing the corporation as 
merely a “network of contracts” 62. This metaphor signifies that all a company is regarded to 
be, is a system of different contracts. Accordingly, a company is not considered to have any 
further responsibility towards the society, as in Germany. The sole purpose of a company is 
instead to make profit to its shareholders. In accordance with Common Law tradition, the role 
of the legislator is to involve as little as possible, and hence the traditional British view of 
corporate law drastically differs from the traditional European view.  
As a consequence of the British Common Law tradition, the UK was the Member State 
that had to change its corporate legislation most in adapting its regulations to the Second 
                                                 
57The GmbH is regulated in GmbHgesetz (GmbHG) and there are about 500 000 GmbH in Germany, see SOU 
1997:168 p.51. 
58 Dorresteijn – European Corporate Law, p. 71. Maitland-Walker – Guide to European Company Laws, p. 173. 
59 Maitland-Walker – Guide to European Company Laws, p. 174. 
60 “Local court” is signified in relation to the registered office.  
61 Maitland-Walker – Guide to European Company Laws, p. 175. Dorresteijn – European Corporate Law, p. 71. 
62 Kübler - The Rules on Capital under the Pressure of the Securities markets, p. 7.  
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Company Law Directive. Before the EU entry, there was, for example, no requirement of 
minimum share capital. Due to this background the UK, and also Ireland, loudly opposed the 
extending of legal capital rules to private companies which the countries, as known, 
succeeded in.63 As a result, the regulations regarding public and private companies diverge to 
a great extent in the UK, though the two companies are regulated in the same statue, the 
Companies Act (CA).  
British legislation does not only differ with regards to culture and tradition, but also the 
terms used are different. The British capital regulation system is, first of all, based upon a 
distinction between what is called authorised and issued share capital. The authorised share 
capital must be stated in the memorandum of association and represents the maximum amount 
of share capital that a company can issue at any given time64. This capital operates as a limit 
on a company’s ability to raise new finance through share issues, but it does not indicate how 
much finance has previously been raised by shares issues.65 The issued share capital, on the 
other hand, is the amount of share capital that has been allotted by a company at any time. 66 
As been stated, there was no legal requirement of either a minimum authorised, or a 
minimum issued, share capital under previous UK regulations. However, due to the Second 
Directive, publicly held companies today must have an authorised share capital of at least £ 
50,000 (about 72,700 euro) according to Article 118 of the Companies Act (CA). 
Furthermore, the share capital must be stated in the Memorandum.67 The amount paid up in 
respect of nominal amount of shares represents a company’s paid-up share capital. The paid-
up share capital regarding public companies is regulated in Article 101 CA. According to the 
Article a public company must have a paid-up share capital of at least one quarter of the 
nominal value of the shares. Based on the minimum share capital of £ 50,000, this implies that 
at least £ 12,500 must be paid up before the company starts trading.68  
 
As states under part 3.3.1, the shareholders of a British privately held company, have the 
unique position of deciding by themselves what the share capital shall be.69 It should also be 
noted, that even when the shareholders decide to have a share capital, there is no regulation of 
the amount which a company must raise before incorporating. Many private companies do in 
                                                 
63 Enriques & Mecey– Creditors versus Capital Formation: The Case against the European Legal Capital Rules, 
p. 5.  
64 Companies Act 1985, Article 2 (5)(a) 
65 Ferran - Company Law and Corporate Finance, p. 44. 
66 Ferran - Company Law and Corporate Finance, p. 45.  
67 Maitland-Walker– Guide to European Company Laws, p. 453, Dorresteijn– European Corporate Law, p. 82. 
68 Ferran - Company Law and Corporate Finance, p. 46 
69 SOU 1997:168, p. 56 and  Andersson – Om Vinstutdelning från Aktiebolag, p. 94.  
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fact operate with a token amount of share capital £ 100 or less. Of about 1.25 million 
registered UK companies, 1.1 million had an issued share capital of less than £ 1000 and, of 
these, 80 per cent had £ 100 or less. 70 
Except for shares issued for cash, shares may also be issued in kind in both public and 
private companies. In contrast to Germany, however, shares in private companies may be 
issued both in return for assets and also in return for services.71 Notable is also, that there is 
no general obligation for private corporations to obtain a formal valuation of either the assets, 
or the services contributed. The result may therefore be that shares are actually issued at a 
discount, something that is prohibited under Article 100.72 Concerning public companies, 
however, Article 103 CA, in accordance with Second Company Law Directive, now requires 
public companies to value assets transferred as consideration in an independent expert’s 
report.73 
 
3.3.3 Final Remarks on European Capital Formation Rules 
In the two European legislative models presented, the German model represents the main part 
of the European states, whereas the UK model more must be seen as an exception in European 
legislations. Both systems are however important and influential for European company law, 
and the rules on capital formation can be summarized as follow:  
 
 
 
 
Share Capital  Contributions in kind 
 2nd Directive         25,000 euro        assets of economic value 
Germany 
Public AG     50,000 euro   assets of economic value 
Private Gmb          25,000 euro    assets of economic value 
The UK 
Public Ltd     £ 50,000  assets of economic value 
Private Ltd       -------  assets & undertakings to 
                     perform services 
 
 
National regulations concerning European publicly held companies have been harmonized 
through the Second Company Law Directive. Therefore, although legislations may have 
differed with regards to minimum share capital amount and submission of this capital 
                                                 
70 Ferran- Company Law and Corporate Finance, p. 46 
71 Dorresteijn – European Corporate Law, p. 83. 
72 For a closer understanding see the leading case Re Wragg Ltd, see Hicks & Goo – Company Law, p. 278. 
73 Hicks & Goo – Company Law, p. 279-280.  
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previous, legislations within the EU today are more or less similar. One observation made, 
however, was that both Germany and the UK require the double share capital amount than 
required by the Directive.  
The differences between legislations concerning private companies are, however, both 
numerous and contrasting. As stated, all private company forms in Europe require a minimum 
share capital before incorporating, except in the UK and in Ireland where companies may start 
trading with a capital of just £ 1. Moreover, there are differences with regards to contributions 
made in kind. In the UK both assets and undertakings to perform services are valid as 
contributions without any expert’s valuation report to be required. These lax rules are thus 
significantly diverse from German and other continental European regulations which require 
strict valuation procedures. To sum up, it is accordingly much more inexpensive, and less 
bureaucratic, to start up a private company in the UK or Ireland, compared to other EU 
Member States. As a consequence, creditors in these countries sustain considerably less 
protection by law.     
 
3.4 Capital Maintenance Regulations 
 
Since corporations aim to generate profit to shareholders, the regulations on capital formation 
would be rather meaningless as creditor protection if there were not complementary 
regulation of how the paid-up capital may be distributed from a company.74 The second tier of 
the Second Directive therefore deals with the maintenance of the share capital contributed. To 
prevent capital from being distributed from the company, Article 15 of the Directive hence 
limits the amount that the company may distribute to its shareholders. The term distribution75 
in this thesis concern dividend distributions in forms of either money or other property to the 
shareholders. Both open distributions, i.e. distributions where the decision of making 
distributions have been taken at the ordinary shareholders meeting, or by other authorized 
decision making organ as for example the board of directors, as well as colourable 
transaction, i.e. where no such formal decision has been taken, are comprised by the Second 
Directive.  
Article 15 is based on the distinction between restricted and non-restricted equity. In 
conformity with the first-tier-rules, the paid-up share capital is considered restricted equity of 
                                                 
74 Andersson – Om Vinstutdelning från Aktiebolag, p.271and Edwards – EC Company Law, p. 68.  
75 The English term “distribution” corresponds to the German term “ausschüttong”. 
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the company, together with the premium fund76, legally required reserves that are not 
distributable, the revaluation reserve and other reserves that are not distributable according to 
the articles of association.77 For the protection of creditors, the restricted equity may never be 
distributed back to the shareholders. Contrarily, a company may distribute other means, i.e. 
non-restricted equity. As a consequence of this principle on protection of the restricted equity, 
a balance-sheet test must be made before any distributions are made, ensuring that the 
distribution will not trespass the restricted equity.78 
Nevertheless, it must be noticed that even when a cushion of restricted equity is built up in 
the company, this capital is not kept in a box or in an account reserved for the creditors. This 
capital may be used in the business of the company and may accordingly decrease as the 
company starts trading. All assets may be lost legally if the company conducts loss-making 
business activity, this situation cannot be prevented by the legislator.79 The legal principle is, 
however, that the members may not plunder the company of the capital that they have paid in. 
As a consequence, the shareholders may not freely dispose over the company assets.80  
A further security for the creditors is provided by Article 16. The Article prescribes that 
any distribution made contrary to Article 15, always must be returned by the shareholder who 
received it, if the company proves that the shareholder knew of the irregularity of the 
distributions made to him, or could not in view of the circumstances have been unaware of 
it.81 
 
3.4.1 Distribution to Shareholders in Germany 
It has been held that the German legal capital rules are representative for the most states in 
Europe. With regards to distribution to shareholders, however, the German rules on public 
companies stand out as both strict and comprehensive in a European comparison.82 The 
decision to make dividend distribution must always be taken by the shareholders meeting, 
Article 174 AktG. Moreover, the fundamental rules of shareholder distributions are found in 
Article 57 and in Article 58, fifth paragraph, AktG. Article 57 is the most central for the 
protection of creditors and prescribes an unconditional prohibition of distributions to 
                                                 
76 This fund consists of the premiums that arise when to company issues new shares, see also Article 9 and 10 of 
the Fourth Company Law Directive.    
77 Andersson– Om Vinstutdelning från Aktiebolag, p. 76-77.  
78 Edwards– EC Company Law p. 70 
79 Hicks & Goo – Company Law, p. 274.  
80 Bergström – Aktiebolagets grundproblem, s.170 
81 Edwards – EC Company Law, p. 70. 
82 Andersson – Om Vinstutdelning från Aktiebolag, p. 82.  
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shareholders other then according to the regulations in the AktG.83 The prohibition 
accordingly does not only imply a protection of the restricted equity, which is what the 
Second Directive requires. Instead, there is a prohibition with regards to all distributions to 
shareholders which are not made in accordance with the AktG. All payments to the 
shareholders must be in entirety compliance with the regulations of the statue. This implies, 
for example, that colourable transactions are not allowed under any circumstances in an AG.84 
Accordingly, to be a legal transaction the decision of distribution must always be taken by the 
shareholders meeting, see Article 174 AktG.85  
In accordance with Article 16 of the Second Directive, an illegal distribution of the 
company’s assets is accompanied by a duty of restitution to the company for benefits 
received, under Article 62 AktG. Moreover, transactions in contrast to the AktG are as a 
principle always invalid under Article 134 of the German Civil Code BGB.86   
 
In Germany, the regulations concerning distributions to shareholders in private corporations, 
the GmbH, are considerably more liberal than compared to the AG regulations. Under Article 
30 GmbHG, the part owners of the company are not entitled to either fully or partly distribute 
assets that will fall below debts and the share capital. Accordingly, the principle is that 
distributions are permissible as long as they do not trespass the share capital.87 This principle 
applies independently of whether all part owners have given approval or not. Accordingly, 
contrary what is stated regarding the AG, the statement in Article 30 GmbHG is not a 
distribution prohibition, but a distribution restriction. Colourable transactions are hence 
permissible as long as the distribution does not trespass the restricted equity.88 
If a distribution is made in contrast to Article 30 GmbHG a duty of restitution to the 
company is stated in Article 31 GmbHG. Moreover, illegal distributions may furthermore be 
invalid under certain provisions under Article 134 BGB.89  
                                                 
83 Andersson – Om Vinstutdelning från Aktiebolag, p. 83 
84 Andersson– Om Vinstutdelning från Aktiebolag, p. 82-83.  
85 It should however be noted that the shareholders may not dispose over the non-restricted equity as they wish. 
The management board, Vorstand, may make allocations to free funds with up to 50% of the annual financial 
results according to Article 58 (2) AktG. In addition to this, it should also be noted that the company it required 
to set of means to a legal fund, according to Article 150 AktG, something that is not required in UK companies.  
86 Andersson – Om Vinstutdelning från Aktiebolag, p. 83. 
87 Dorresteijn – European Corporate Law, p. 88.  
88 Note, however, that a colourable transaction may be illegal with respect to competence exceeding of the 
corporate executives, be in conflict with the duty of loyalty or the principle of equality.  
89 Andersson – Om Vinstutdelning från Aktiebolag, p. 87. 
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3.4.2 Distribution to Shareholders in the UK 
Traditionally, the regulations regarding distribution of dividends have been extremely liberal 
in Britain compared to the rest of Europe. The principle rule has been that companies were 
able to make distributions to the shareholders as long as the company at the time of the 
distribution was not, or as a consequence of the distribution would become, insolvent. 90 
However, also in this area the regulations became more stringent as the UK adjusted to the 
requirements of the Second Company Law Directive.91 Today, Article 263 to 281 CA 
therefore limits distributions to be made legally. The regulations are mandatory and the stated 
Articles include “every description of distribution of a company’s assets to its members, 
whether in cash or otherwise”92.  
If something else has not been stated in the articles of association, the decision regarding 
distribution of dividends is taken by the shareholders meeting. If, however, the company uses 
the standard articles of association, Table A, the shareholders meeting may decide to 
distribute assets amounting to maximum what has been suggested by the board of directors.93 
Thus, the power of the shareholders meeting may be significantly limited, compared to what 
applies in Germany and other continental European states.      
Assets of a company available for distribution to the shareholders, are assets within the 
scope of the company’s net profit of the year and profit brought forward from earlier years, 
with a reduction of accumulated losses, Article 263 (1) and (3).94 Hence, distributions are 
permissible as long as they do not trespass on the share capital. Concerning public companies 
there is also a further requirement under Article 264 (1).  The Article prescribe that  
distributions may only be made when the amount of the company’s net assets is not less than 
the aggregate of its called up share capital and undistributable reserves. Furthermore, 
distributions may only be made if, and to that extent that, the distribution does not reduce the 
amount of those assets to less than that aggregate. Consequently, this additional requirement 
gives effect to Article 15 of the Second Company Law Directive and the result is that only 
non-restricted capital may be distributed in a public company.95  
 
                                                 
90 More about the previous British regulations see Andersson – Om Vinstutdelning från Aktiebolag, p. 95.  
91 SOU 1997:168, p. 56. 
92 Ferran - Company Law and Corporate Finance, p. 417. 
93 See Articles 102 and 103 of Table A. Hicks & Goo,– Company Law, p. 280, SOU 1997:168 p. 57 and 
Andersson – Om vinstutdelning från Aktiebolag, p.98.  
94 Hicks & Goo – Company Law, p. 280-281 and SOU 1997:168, p. 57. 
95 Ferran - Company Law and Corporate Finance, p. 419. 
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Concerning private companies, only Article 263 is applicable. Consequently, private 
companies may distribute assets as long as the distribution does not trespass the share capital. 
However, it must be noted that even though the principle is that distributions may not trespass 
on the share capital, the result of the provision is dramatically different whit respect to the 
private companies. As been states, there is no requirement of a minimum share capital in 
private companies. Many private companies do also in fact have a share capital of £ 100 or 
less, why more or less all of the company’s assets may be distributed in practice.96 Creditors 
of private Ltd companies are however not without all protections as it may seem. In 
accordance with the provisions that applied before the UK entered into the EU, there is a well-
developed doctrine of “piercing the corporate veil”, implying that creditors may put forward 
their claims directly towards the shareholders as these under certain circumstances may be 
personally liable for the company’s debts.97 See more about this doctrine under chapter four 
where the American regulations are briefly presented.  
The consequence if distributions are made in contravention of the law is, according to 
Article 277, for both private and public companies, that a receiver in bad faith is liable to 
repay the amount to the company.98 Furthermore, directors who authorised the illegal 
distribution are liable to repay the money to the company, unless they justifiably relied on the 
accuracy of the accounts.99 This provision accordingly goes further than what is required 
under the Second Directive and may compensate poorly protected creditors in private 
companies to some extent.  
 
3.4.3  Final Remarks on the Rules regarding Distribution to Shareholders  
The regulations regarding distributions to shareholders in Europe may be summarized as 
follows: 
                             Non-Distributable Assets                    Consequence of Illegal Distribution 
2nd Directive         restricted equity     repayment by shareholder 
Germany       
Public AG          distribution prohibition     repayment by shareholder 
Private Gmb         share capital      repayment by shareholder 
The UK       
Public Ltd          restricted equity  │repayment by shareholder 
Private Ltd          share capital   │& person who took decision 
                                                 
96 Ferran - Company Law and Corporate Finance, p. 417-419. see also Andersson – Om vinstutdelning från 
Aktiebolag, p.96.  
97 Andersson– Kapitalskyddet i Aktiebolag, p. 159.  
98 See also Precision Dippings Ltd v Precisions Dippings Marketing Ltd (1986) Ch 447, Chort of Appeal, Hicks, 
& Goo – Company Law, p. 283  
99 According to case Re Exchange Banking Co. (1882) 21 ChD 519, Court of Appeal, Flitcroft´s Case, see Hicks 
& Goo – Company Law, p. 282-283 
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Even though the area is harmonized with respect to public companies, national legislations are 
not identical. Most notably, there is a difference of how much assets that may be distributed. 
The Second Directive state that all assets except the restricted equity may be distributed 
which is what also apply to British public companies. In Germany on the other hand, there is a 
much stricter provision. For a distribution to be permitted it must always be in accordance 
with the law, implying that only open distribution that not trespass on the restricted equity 
will be permitted.  
In private companies, the variation between national legislation is even wider. Though, 
both German and UK regulations prescribe that the share capital contributed may not be 
distributed, the result of the regulations differ radically as the regulations are based on the 
share capital contributed. As stated, the German private company GmbH requires a minimum 
share capital of at least 25,000 euro before registering, while there is no requirement at all 
with respect to the private Ltd. Accordingly most of the assets in a private Ltd may be 
distributed to the shareholders. In accordance with what was stated under part 3.3.3, the 
statutory protection provided to creditors in the UK is significantly less than compared to 
Germany and other European states.   
 
To sum up this long chapter, legal capital regulations are applied in Europe to provide 
company creditors with a protection from shareholder misconduct. Strong interference by the 
legislator is a characteristic and the regulations are in general detailed. The regulations are   
similar in most of the European states, and their approach is represented by the German 
legislation in the previous presentation. Even the regulations between the two company forms, 
privately and publicly held companies, can be held to be similar. Although the details may 
vary, the construction and fundamentals of the regulations are the same. In short, the 
protection is created by requiring a capital at the formation of the company, and which later 
on may not be distributed from the company to the shareholders. Under this construction, a 
cushion will be built up and preserved in the company as a guarantee for both contracting and 
involuntary creditors´ claims.  
However, as presented, there are variations also within Europe comprising of mainly the 
UK and Irish legislations. The regulations of public companies which are harmonised under 
the Second Directive are naturally similar to the rest of Europe. The regulations regarding 
private companies on the other hand drastically differ, mainly since there is no minimum 
share capital requirement. These regulations, or lack of regulations, derive from the British 
Common Law tradition. In the following chapter, the Common Law tradition will be further 
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presented when the US legislation will be briefly reviewed. The reason for presenting these 
regulations in a thesis concerning Europe is first and foremost to provide a deeper 
understanding of the European regulations by contrasting our regulations to the American 
ones. Furthermore, the regulations are also presented since they are internationally known, 
and moreover since Europe have a tendency to be influenced by our big neighbour in the 
West.   
 
 
CHAPTER 4 AMERICAN CAPITAL RULES_____________________ 
 
Any serious discussion about legal capital rules cannot ignore to at least present an overview 
of the American system. As been described when presenting Common Law Legal Culture, the 
American view of company law differs drastically from the European. In a society based on 
values of individualism100 the legislator generally stays out of interfering in market conditions 
as much as possible. The rules existing on companies´ capital therefore presents radically 
different features and plays only a limited role.101 This situation does however not mean that 
there is no protection of creditors. Instead, other techniques are used, which, according to an 
American point of view, is held to be more effective as creditor protection than techniques 
applied in Europe. Even though the American regulations only will be briefly reviewed, the 
rules will provide an important base for further comparison in the following chapters. 
In the US nearly all of the company law is state law, as the impact of Federal Government 
generally is minimal.102 There is however a model act, the Model Business Corporation Act 
(RMBCA103), dealing with both public and closed corporations, and which has been adopted 
by more than half of the US states.104 This presentation will focus on the MBCA, but 
references will also be made to other systems applied by influential states.  
 
 
                                                 
100 Chase – American “Exceptionalism” and Comparative Procedure, p. 1.   
101 Also in countries as Canada and Australia legal capital rules tend to have limited role, see Wymeersch – Some 
Recent Trends and Developments in Company Law, p. 13  
102 Kübler– The Rule on Capital under the Pressure of the Securities Markets, p. 3. 
103 The shortening is RMBCA since the MBCA was revised in 1984. See Andersson – Om Vinstutdelning från 
Aktiebolag, p. 107 
104 Morrisson, - Fundamentals of American Law p. 333. 
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4.1 Capital Formation & Shareholder Distributions 
  
The American view considers requirements of minimum share capital to be arbitrary and 
insufficient, and thus that such capital cannot provide any meaningful protection to 
creditors.105 In accordance with this theory, only a handful states have a statutory required 
share capital.106 However, in the states that does prescribe a minimum share capital, the 
amount required considerably lower than in Europe with a maximum of $ 1000.107 One state 
which still has this type of requirement is the corporately important state of Delaware, where 
more than half a million business entities have their legal home and which include more than 
50% of all U.S. publicly-traded companies and 58% of the Fortune 500.108 In general, 
however, it is extremely rare with minimum share capital requirements in the US, and the 
RMBCA provides no such recommendation. Instead the registration of a corporation may 
occur without regard to the capital contribution, and similar to an English private Ltd it is 
accordingly enough with merely $ 1 in share capital for a company to be incorporated.109  
The difference between the US and Europe is even more obvious where the considerations 
for shares to be paid by assets other than cash. The RMBCA allows for any sort of property 
right, including services to be performed or contracts for services to be performed, which are 
strictly prohibited under the Second Directive, see part 3.3.110 Moreover, under the RMBCA it 
is for the board of the corporation to determine if the consideration received for the shares is 
adequate, not an independent expert.111  
 
Also regarding dividend distribution the American approach differ highly from continental 
European. There are two major systems112 of which the first is similar to the European system 
and which is applied for example states as Delaware and New York. This model is based on a 
classical capital construction and funded on a principle of restricted equity.113 However, 
                                                 
105 Andersson – Om vinstutdelning från Aktiebolag, p. 107-108. 
106 Morrisson - Fundamentals of American Law p. 337 and Andersson – Om Vinstutdelning från Aktiebolag, p. 
107. 
107 Andersson– Om Vinstutdelning från Aktiebolag, p. 108. 
108Since so many corporations are incorporated in the Delaware the state is accordingly leading and influential in 
corporate law making.  For statistics see http://www.state.de.us/corp/default.shtml  and also Lucian Arye – 
Federalism and the Corporation: The desirable limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, p. 1  
109 Kübler – The Rule on Capital under the Pressure of the Securities Markets, p. 3. 
110 Kübler – The Rule on Capital under the Pressure of the Securities Markets, p. 3. 
111 Article 6.21 (c) RMBCA 
112 There is also held to be a third model in the US which is applied in the state of California. See Andersson – 
Om Vinstutdelning från Aktiebolag, p. 111-112.  
113 Andersson – Om Vinstutdelning från Aktiebolag, p. 111. 
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considering what has just been stated regarding share capital amounts, the American system 
widely differ our system based on restricted equity in Europe.  
The second system, which is recommended under the RMBCA, implies that distributions 
to the shareholders are allowed as long as the company is not, or due to the payment, will not 
become either insolvent or insufficient.114 This solvency test system has so far not had the 
same impact at state level as the abolishment of the minimum share capital requirement. 
There is however a significant number of states that have adopted the system and the number 
of states are estimated to increase.115 In sum, it should nevertheless be observed that neither in 
the Delaware system, nor under the RMBCA model, capital is a barrier for the distribution of 
dividends to shareholders.116 
In addition to these lax rules, and in contrast to what applies in Europe, the principle rule in 
American corporate law is that the board of directors, and not the shareholders meeting, takes 
the decision of dividend distribution.117 Accordingly, the board of the corporation has the 
discretion to determine how much dividend that will be paid to the shareholders. Moreover, if 
a distribution has been mad in contrast with the law, there is no creditor protection obliging 
shareholder to refund the payment. Neither is there a regulation that the directors who took 
the decision may have to refund the payment.118   
 
4.2 Protection of Involuntary Creditors 
 
As mentioned, the American system is built up around values of individualism and 
accordingly creditors wanting to participate in corporate business have to protect themselves. 
However, considering involuntary creditors, not all creditors have the possibility of 
contracting their security. Compared to the European legal capital system, there is no capital-
cushion in the company since the only requirement is that the company remains solvent. 
Accordingly, often there will be no money to cover the claims of involuntary creditors. As a 
result, other mechanisms have been invented to protect these creditors, one of the most 
important is the doctrine of “piercing the corporate veil”.119 This metaphor is used to describe 
the judicial act of imposing personal liability on otherwise immune shareholders for the 
                                                 
114 RMBCA § 6.40 (c)(1). See also Andersson – Om Vinstutdelning från Aktiebolag, p. 109-110. 
115 Andersson – Om Vinstutdelning från Aktiebolag, p. 111. 
116 Kübler – The Rule on Capital under the Pressure of the Securities markets, p. 4. 
117 Andersson – Om Vinstutdelning från Aktiebolag, p. 112 
118 Andersson – Om Vinstutdelning från Aktiebolag, p. 113-114. 
119 Miller – Piercing the Corporate Veil Among Affiliated Companies in the European Community and in the 
US: A Comparative Analysis of US, German and UK Veilpiercing Approaches, p.3. 
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corporation’s wrongful acts. The doctrine is based on case law and regarded as extremely 
extensive and messy.120 Hence, it is suffice to say that in protection of (involuntary) creditors, 
shareholders in American corporations may under certain conditions be personally liable for 
the debts of the corporation (the interested reader is referred to reference under footnote 121). 
As a Common Law country, also the UK applies this doctrine.121  
Second, involuntary creditors are moreover protected by mandatory insurances. These 
insurances mainly serve as protection if, under certain conditions, the limited liability will not 
be restrained.    
 
 
Leaving these descriptive chapters behind, the thesis will now continue with studying the 
recent and present development of European company law with respect to legal capital.  
Bearing in mind the regulations presented, the following chapters will consider factors that 
have come to challenge, and even question, the whole concept of a legal capital regime. The 
whole system of regulations presented, are namely at present facing both antagonism and 
harsh criticism.     
 
 
CHAPTER 5 LEGAL CAPITAL RULES IN THE LIGHT OF EU 
____________________GOALS, A COMMON MARKET & ECJ CASE LAW___ 
 
Taking into consideration the regulations presented above, statutory creditor protection is 
obviously a fundamental objective in both national Member States and within the EU. The 
reason for harmonizing the capital area was even stated to be an increased protection of 
creditors in public companies, which indirectly has affected also private companies in most 
states. This harmonization objective is, however, only a part of a larger objective within the 
European Community. In a wider perspective, harmonisation is an instrument of reaching 
fundamental goals of the European Community. One of these fundamental goals is the 
realization of a Common Market based on free movement and free establishment of all 
production factors.    
                                                 
120 Miller – Piercing the Corporate Veil Among Affiliated Companies in the European Community and in the 
US: A Comparative Analysis of US, German and UK Veilpiercing Approaches, p.4. See the whole article for an 
overview of the doctrine.  
121 Miller – Piercing the Corporate Veil Among Affiliated Companies in the European Community and in the 
US: A Comparative Analysis of US, German and UK Veilpiercing Approaches, p.3. 
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In recent years, the ECJ has rendered a number of controversial rulings based on the 
realization of this Common Market where the outcome of the judgments supported an 
extended freedom of establishment for companies.  The effects of the decisions, however, 
have proven to be very controversial, and even contrary, to the traditions of European legal 
capital rules as presented above. Hence, the objective of this chapter is to present the 
development of the Common Market, to see what effects this development have had on the 
traditional rules on capital.  
To provide a better understanding of the cases presented, and moreover an understanding 
of why the present regulations have come under pressure, fundamental goals of the European 
Community and incident regulations will be briefly reviewed. 
 
    5.1 EU Goals of a Common Market & Freedom of Establishment 
 
In 1957, the European Economic Community (EEC) was established through the Treaty of 
Rome. The purpose was to lay down the foundations for “an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe”122. The Community was based on theories of economic growth through 
cooperation, and the main goal was to engage a closer economic relationship between the 
participating nations. This goal was realized through the establishment of a customs union and 
by the adoption of a Single Market based on the principle of free movement over the boarders 
concerning the factors of production (goods, services, labor and capital).123 In 1986 the 
Community cooperation expanded even further through the adoption of the Single European 
Act (SEA) and through the establishment of the Common Market. The aim was to expand 
economic integration and growth even more, which was to be realized by securing free 
movement of the four freedoms by eliminating all barriers of establishment. 
The regulations regarding the four freedoms have all been laid down in the Treaty of 
Rome. The Treaty moreover contains a chapter on freedom of establishment for both natural 
and legal persons. The freedom of establishment is often counted as the fifth freedom within 
the Common Market, but strictly speaking, it is a part within the free movement of persons.124 
The specific rules are fund within Articles 43-48 and are based on the EC fundamental 
                                                 
122 Article 1, Treaty on the European Union 
123 These four freedoms are all laid down in the Rome Treaty and Article 14 expresses: “The Common Market 
shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this treaty”. See Steiner & Woods – Textbook on EC Law, 
p.5   
124 Edwards – EC Company Law, p. 336-337  
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principle of equivalence, stated in Article 12. This principle implies that national rules cannot 
discriminate on their face against non-nationals, nor can they be applied in a discriminatory 
way.125  
     The Articles relevant are Article 43 and Article 48 which have to be red together to be 
understood correctly.126 Article 43 states that restrictions on the freedom of establishment of 
nationals of a Member State, within the territory of another Member State, shall be 
prohibited. The prohibition applies also to restrictions on the setting-up of agencies, branches 
or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in the Community. Accordingly, 
Article 43 concerns natural persons, and the Article has been held to have direct effect.127 
Article 48 on the other hand, concerns legal persons and states that also companies and firms 
formed in accordance with the law of a Member State shall enjoy the same freedom of 
establishment as natural persons.128 Consequently, both foreign citizens and companies have 
equal opportunities of national citizens and companies to practice economic activity.  
The wording of Article 43 and 48 may appear to provide both natural and legal persons a 
rather extended freedom of establishment. It is however important to observe that these 
Articles are not a guarantee of a general right to establishment within another Member State. 
They merely imply that there will be equality in establishment opportunities between national 
and foreign subjects.129 
 
As companies started to make use of their freedom of establishment, rather complicated issues 
of what were to be comprised in this freedom was raised. If a company incorporated in one 
Member State conducted business in other Member States, which states company law would 
apply? These issues have their origin in the fact that two principles of connection between a 
company and a state are applied within the Community, the incorporation principle and the 
real seat principle. The former imply that it is always the state of incorporation that have 
jurisdiction with regards to company law, while the latter imply that it is the state where the 
company has its real seat which will have jurisdiction.130 
As the sole interpreter of the Treaty, it hence was the task of the ECJ to answer these 
issues. This position as interpreter has come to place the Court in a very powerful position in 
                                                 
125 Steiner & Woods – Textbook on EC Law, p.189. 
126 Steiner & Woods – Textbook on EC Law, p.336-337. See also Wymeersch – Centros: A Landmark Decision 
in European Company Law, p 630 and Wymeersch – The Transfer of the Company’s Seat in European Company 
Law, p.12. 
127 Case C-81/87 Daily Mail, para 15. See also Steiner & Woods – Textbook on EC Law, p.189. 
128 Article 48, Treaty of Rome 
129 Edwards – EC Company Law, p. 336-337. See also Case 81/87 Daily  Mail, para 16. 
130 Wymeersch – The Transfer of the Company’s Seat in European Company Law, p. 5-8.  
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determining future company law. In trying to interpret what the freedom of establishment 
entailed, the Court has given several important preliminary rulings, as for example, Case C 
183/83 Segers131, Case C-212/97 Centros132, Case C-208/00 Überseering133 Case C-167/01 
Inspire Art134 which all have had tremendous impact on European company law. However, 
only the Centros and the Inspire Art case directly concerned rules on capital, and will thus be 
re-examined and analysed below to see what impact the cases have had on legal capital rules.  
 
5.2 The Centros Case  
 
It has been over six years since the Centros Ltd v. Erhvervs- og Selskapsstyrelsen case was 
rendered, but in those few years the case has become almost legendary. The case has been 
held to be one of the most mentioned cases ever of the ECJ, and there is no doubt that this 
judgment belongs to the cases that have affected European company law the most.135  
 
5.2.1 Facts of the case  
The factual circumstances of the case were simple: A Danish married couple wanted to set up 
an incorporated business in Denmark. Danish law, however, required a share capital input on 
formation amounting to about 28 000 Euro. The couple therefore decided to set up a private 
Ltd in the UK which only required a starting capital of £ 100.136 Without starting any business 
activity in the UK the couple applied for registration of a branch at the Danish registry 
office137. The Danish authority, however, refused to register a branch of Centros since the 
company, according to the authority, was in effect seeking to establish in Denmark, not a 
branch, but its principal establishment.138 Moreover, the Danish authority held, the company 
intended by doing so to escape the application of the Danish rules on minimum capital.139 As 
a consequence of the rejection, Centros filed law suit and argued in Court that the refusal of 
registration was incompatible with the EC rules on freedom of establishment. The Danish 
Court referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling and asked whether it was compatible with 
                                                 
131 Case C-182/83 Segers v. Bedrijfsverening, 1984. 
132 Case C-212/97 Centros Ltd v. Erhvervs- og Selskapsstyrelsen, 1999. 
133 Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. NCC GmbH, 5 November 2002. 
134 Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd, , 2003. 
135 Wymeersch – Centros: A Landmark Decision in European Company Law, p 629. 
136 Case C-212/97 Centros, para 7.   
137 Case C-212/97 Centros, para 6.  
138 Wymeersch– Centros: A Landmark Decision in European Company Law, p 629. 
139 Case C-212/97 Centros, para 7. 
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Articles 42 and 48, to refuse registration of a branch company which has its registered office 
in another Member State, and has been lawfully funded and exists in conformity with the 
legislation of that country, though the sole purpose of the establishment was to circumvent 
national legal capital rules.140  
 
5.2.2 Court Reasoning; permission to circumvent national rules  
In its answer to the national court, the ECJ started out by stating that the present situation, in 
which a company formed in accordance with the law of one Member State desires to set up a 
branch in another Member State, “falls within the scope of Community law”141. This principle 
applies without regards to the fact that the sole purpose of the establishment may have been to 
circumvent national host state regulations.142 That is how Article 43 and Article 48 is to be 
interpreted.143 The consequence of this interpretation is accordingly that companies are 
entitled to carry on their businesses in other Member States than where incorporated through 
agencies, branches or subsidiaries, however, subject under the laws of the incorporation state. 
Moreover, the Court stated, to refuse a company this right implies that the company is 
prevented from exercising its freedom to establishment.144  
 
In an attempt to justify its acting, the Danish authorities claimed that the establishment of 
Centos´ branch constituted an abuse, as it was acknowledged that the only purpose of 
incorporating in the UK was to circumvent Danish national regulations. In their submission, 
Denmark therefore claimed that host states must be entitled to take steps to prevent such 
abuse by refusing to register the branch.145 In answer to this claim, the Court held that 
Member States indeed do have some possibilities to take measures of preventing individuals 
from improperly or fraudulently taking advantage of provisions of Community law.146 
However, the Court stated, it cannot in itself constitute an abuse if a person that wishes to set 
                                                 
140 Case C-212/97 Centros, para 13 + 14 and Wymeersch – Centros: A Landmark Decision in European 
Company Law, p 630.  
141 Case C-212/97 Centros, para 17 and Wymeersch – Centros: A Landmark Decision in European Company 
Law, p 633 - 634 
142 Case C-212/97 Centros, para 18. See also Holst – European Company Law after Centros: Is the EU on the 
Road to Delaware?, p. 3–4 and Wymeersch – Centros: A Landmark Decision in European Company Law, p 634 
+ 641. 
143 Case C-212/97 Centros, para 18 + 19  
144 Case C-212/97 Centros, para 20, 21 & 23, Wymeersch – Centros: A Landmark Decision in European 
Company Law, p 647 and Holst – European Company Law after Centros: Is the EU on the Road to Delaware?, 
p. 4 
145 Case C-212/97 Centros, para 31 + 32 
146 Wymeersch– Centros: A Landmark Decision in European Company Law, p 638-639 
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up a company in a Member State chooses to do so in the stat that he, or she, considers to have 
the least restrictive company regulations, and then set up a branch in another Member State.147  
Accordingly, only if the circumvention of national rules would constitute improperly or 
fraudulently abuse host states have some possibilities to take preventive measures. With 
regards to this abuse, the Court moreover distinguished between circumvention of rules 
relating to the formation of companies, and rules concerning the carrying on of certain trades, 
professions, or businesses. The second category, carrying on business, was held to might have 
a bearing and justify preventive measure. The former category, where regulations as 
minimum share capital belong, has, however, no effect on the establishment of a firm. Hence, 
legal capital rules requiring a minimum share capital cannot be invoked to refuse access.148  
 
After stating that Denmark’s argument on abuse could not justify the refuse to register the 
branch, the Court went on to looking at if there was any other ground of justification. In case 
law previous Centros, the Court had establishes a doctrine implying that national legislation 
might be justified with reference to imperative requirements in the general interest.149 The 
general interest claimed by the Danish authorities, was argued to be the protection of 
primarily public creditors, but also creditors in general. It was argued that a minimum share 
capital requirement was necessary since, unlike contracting creditors, public creditors cannot 
secure their debts by means of guarantees.150 Moreover, a minimum capital requirement was 
argued to be needed to protect all creditors, as the risk of fraudulent bankruptcies, due to the 
insolvency of companies whose initial capitalisation was inadequate, needed to be 
anticipated.151  
With reference to its previous case law, the ECJ stated that if national legislation will be 
justified, though hindering the exercise of the freedom of establishment, the rules must fulfill 
four conditions: First, the regulations must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner, second 
they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest, third they must be 
suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue and fourth, they must 
not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.152  
                                                 
147 Case C-212/97 Centros, para 23-28. See also Bebchuck - Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable 
Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, p. 3 and Wymeersch – Centros: A Landmark Decision in 
European Company Law, p 641. 
148 Wymeersch - Company Law in the 21st Century, p. 7. 
149 This doctrine or test has been named the “Gebhard test” after the principles laid down in Case C-55/94 
Gebhard. 
150Case C-212/97 Centros, para 32. 
151 Case C-212/97 Centros, para 32. 
152 Wymeersch– Centros: A Landmark Decision in European Company Law, p 642-644.  
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After lining up these prerequisites, the Court held that none of these conditions were 
fulfilled.153 This statement was mainly due to the fact that Denmark, as an incorporation 
country, generally was prepared to allow foreign companies into its borders. If Centros had 
been conducting business in the UK, Danish authorities would have registered Centros branch 
in Denmark. This situation, the Court stated, might have proven equally risky to Danish 
creditors.154 Moreover, the Court argued, since Centros held itself out to be a UK company, 
Danish creditors were noticed of the fact that the company was not governed by Danish law, 
and thereby protected.155  
Furthermore, the Court was of the opinion that it had been possible to adopt measures 
which were less restrictive or which at least interfered less with the fundamental freedoms. As 
an example, the Court suggested that it was possible “by law” to protect public creditors to 
obtain necessary guarantees.156 The Court did however not say anything about how this 
protection by law would be constructed. Finally, and with reference to Denmark’s argument 
of protecting creditors in general, the also Court stated that combating fraud, could not in any 
event justify a practice of refusing to register a branch of a company which has its registered 
office in another Member State.157  
Accordingly, the holding of the Centros ruling was that a company registered in one 
Member State, may establish in another Member State without conducting any business in 
this home state, with the sole purpose of circumventing national host states regulations.   
 
5.2.3 Conformity between the Centros Case and European Legal Culture? 
The Centros judgement was received by Member States within the Union in different ways. 
For states as the UK, it was of course a victory to see their lax rules prevail over what they 
considered to be business obstructive regulations. For most Member States, however, the 
ruling was received as devastating, and legal writers were clearly traumatised by the decision. 
For these countries the decision was no victory at all. On the contrary, the result was the 
                                                 
153 Case C-212/97 Centros, para 34. 
154 Case C-212/97 Centros, para 35. 
155 Case C-212/97 Centros, para 36. For the requirement of notice, see Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 
25 July 1978 based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the annual accounts of certain types of companies and 
the Eleventh Council Directive 89/666/EEC of 21 December 1989 concerning disclosure requirements in respect 
of branches opened in a Member State by certain types of company governed by the law of another State. See 
also Bebchuck - Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law., 
p.5 and Wymeersch – The Transfer of the Company’s Seat in European Company Law, p.19. 
156 Case C-212/97 Centros, para 37. 
157 The Danish authorities also referred to Article 46 as a way of justification (public policy, public security or 
public health), but the Court stated that the Danish authorities could present no justifications falling within the 
ambit of Article 46 of the Treaty. 
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undermining of their legislations with respect to foreign companies establishing within their 
territory.     
    As a consequence of the Centros case, many Member States feared that the Court hade 
opened up for “forum shopping” possibilities.158 This term has its origin in American 
corporate law and signifies the situation when companies may select state of incorporation 
with regards to the most favourable company legislation. Since shareholders decide where to 
incorporate, the most favourable legislation will be where this group has the most power to 
act. Considering the conflict described in chapter 2, this location will be where there is little, 
or no, statutory protection of creditors. Accordingly, it may be argued that the effect of the 
Centros case was the creation of an incentive to circumvent national legislations protecting 
creditors to seek more lax regulations. The way the Centros case was worded, it might even 
be claimed that the Court, more or less, exhorted future incorporators to register in states with 
lax legislation to stimulate business activity and economic integration within the Common 
Market.   
It is, however, important to observe that the case did not deal with national (Danish) 
company law, it merely dealt with Community law. Nevertheless, since incentives to 
circumvent national regulations have been held to be created, it follows as a consequence of 
the ruling that to uphold national legal capital regulations will constitute an obstacle to the 
freedom of establishment. National protective legislations may be circumvented in favour of 
the freedom of establishment. In other words, what the Court argued was that national 
company law rules were respectable traditions, but these should surrender to the 
overwhelming thrust of the basic freedoms and the Common Market.  
Accordingly, referring to the heading of this part, the conformity between the Centros Case 
and present legal capital regulations must be held to be weak. However, to say that the 
traditional legal capital rules are contrary to the Centros case and the economic life of the 
Common Market must be regarded to take conclusions too far. National rules on capital may 
still be upheld by Member States for domestic use. Nevertheless, even if national Member 
State regulations are not contrary to EU development, Centros clearly challenged and even 
questioned the concept of such legal capital rules.    
 
                                                 
158 Kersting & Schindler– The ECJ´s Inspire Art Decision of 30 September 2003 and its effect on Practice, p. 
1291 and Birkmose-Sondergaard– The Fear of the Delaware-effect – The American Demon?, p. 246.  
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After the Centros case159, many Member States started to take countermeasures, trying to go 
round the Centros holding as a reaction of  protecting their national interests. Whether 
suchlike countermeasures were permitted or not with regards to Articles 43 and 48 were 
recently reviewed by the ECJ in case C-167/01 Inspire Art.   
 
5.3 The Inspire Art Case 
5.3.1 Facts of the Case  
Inspire Art was a private limited liability company, incorporated in the UK, which was 
dealing with objects of art. Immediately after the company formation, the company started 
conducting business in the Netherlands where also its sole shareholder and director was 
domiciled.160 Just as in the Centros case, no business was ever meant to be conducted in the 
UK, the shareholder only intended to take advantage of the liberal UK company law. Hence, a 
branch was therefore registered in the Netherlands.161  
However, Article 1 of the applicable Dutch law (WFBV) defined companies which did not 
which carry on their activities entirely or almost entirely in the Netherlands, such as Inspire 
Art, as formally foreign companies.162 Article 2 of the same statue then required a company 
falling within that definition of a formally foreign company, to be registered as such in the 
commercial register.163 Moreover, Article 4 WFBV required the subscribed capital of a 
formally foreign company to be at least equal to the minimum amount required of 
Netherlands limited liability companies. If this requirement was not fulfilled the directors 
would be jointly and severally liable.164   
Due to some administrative error, Inspire Art was nevertheless registered in the 
commercial register without any indication that it was formally foreign company. Since such 
indication was mandatory, the Chamber of Commerce applied for an order that this fact 
should be added to Inspire Art’s registration.165 Inspire Art on the other hand, opposed the 
                                                 
159 See also case C-208/00 Überseering, The case both complemented and extended the freedom of 
establishment, stating that Member States always must recognize a company legal capacity when establishing 
within its territory.  
160 Case C-167/01Inspire Art, para 34.  
161 Kersting & Schindler – The ECJ´s Inspire Art Decision of 30 September 2003 and its effect on practice, p. 
1279 
162 Case C-167/01Inspire Art, para 22. 
163 Case C-167/01Inspire Art, para 24. 
164 Case C-167/01Inspire Art, para 25+27 and Kersting & Schindler – The ECJ´s Inspire Art Decision of 30 
September 2003 and its effect on practice, p. 1279-1280.  
165 Case C-167/01Inspire Art, para 36.  
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above requirements and claimed that these were contrasting with Community law. The 
question thus was referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.166 
 
5.3.2 Court Ruling; countermeasures of protection not justifiable  
In its judgment, the Court referred to many of many arguments used in the Centros case. 
These arguments will not be presented fully again but merely be referred to.  
As in Centros, the Court started out by reminding of the fact that companies may be 
formed in one Member State and thereafter exclusively carry on their business in another 
state. Moreover, reasons for which a company chooses to establish in a certain Member State, 
will not affect this freedom of establishment rules, except in cases of fraud, see part 4.2.1.167 
The Netherlands Government did however put forward arguments that the present provisions 
of the WFBV did not hinder the freedom of establishment. Primarily, since foreign companies 
were fully recognised in the Netherlands and they were not refused registration in the business 
register, and second, the Netherlands Government claimed that the provisions only resulted in 
administrative effects.168 The Court did however, not accept these arguments. To the contrary, 
the Court stated that in cases as the present, the host state must respect the legislation of the 
incorporation state regarding minimum capital and directors’ liability.169 Accordingly, the 
countermeasures taken by the Dutch legislator trying to uphold its legal capital rules were 
held to constitute restrictions on the freedom of establishment as guaranteed in the Treaty. 170     
 
After this statement the Court went on to looking at whether there was any justification for the 
Dutch provisions relating to minimum capital and directors' liability.171 Like in previous 
cases, the Court considered the justification grounds relating to the public interest and 
reminded of the four conditions that had to be fulfilled, part 5.2.2 above. As the Danish 
Government, also the Netherlands Government based their justification on grounds of creditor 
protection. However, the Court merely repeated its statements in Centros, see part 5.2.2.172 
                                                 
166 Case C-167/01Inspire Art, para 39 and Kersting & Schindler – The ECJ´s Inspire Art Decision of 30 
September 2003 and its effect on Practice, p. 1280 
167 Case C-167/01Inspire Art, para 95-96. See also Case C-212/97 Centros, para 18. See also Kersting & 
Schindler – The ECJ´s Inspire Art Decision of 30 September 2003 and its effect on Practice, p. 1281.  
168 Case C-167/01Inspire Art, para 99. 
169 Case C-167/01Inspire Art, para 100+101. 
170 Case C-167/01Inspire Art, para 101 & 105 and Kersting & Schindler– The ECJ´s Inspire Art Decision of 30 
September 2003 and its effect on Practice, p. 1281.  
171 The Court first stated that there was no justification under Article 46 concerning public policies, public 
security and public health, see para 131. The Court moreover stated in the Centros case that the protection of 
creditors do not fall within ambit of Article 46. 
172 Case C-167/01Inspire Art, para 131-140.  
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As, Inspire Art was held out to be UK company governed by British law, creditors were put 
on sufficient notice of the rules regulating the company.173 Moreover, the Court held, to the 
extent that the provisions concerning minimum capital were incompatible with freedom of 
establishment, the same necessarily applied regarding the penalties attached to non-
compliance with those obligations, i.e. the personal joint and several liability of directors.174  
Furthermore, the Netherlands Government also referred to factors as countering fraud, 
ensuring that tax inspections were to be effective and that business dealings were fair as 
grounds of public interest. None of these arguments could however justify the Dutch 
requirements in Dutch law. First, since to set up a business where the least restrictive rules are 
is not fraud, see part 4.2.2175, and with regards to the second and third argument that the 
measures in question did not satisfied the criteria of efficacy, proportionality and non-
discrimination.176 Accordingly, the Dutch countermeasures taken imposing requirements on 
the UK Company could not be justified, and were thus not in conformity with Community 
law.  
 
5.3.3 No Ways of Protecting National Legal Capital Rules? 
The Inspire Art case was not received by the Member States in an equally dramatic and 
revolutionary way as the Centros decision was. Partly because much of what the court stated 
in Centros was repeated in the Inspire Art decision, and partly because the decision was more 
expected as a continuation of the Centros case. What the Court did in the Inspire Art case was, 
really, to continue and extend the development it had started in the Centros case.  
Except being a continuation and repetition of the Centros decision, the Inspire Art case, 
however, also had an independent meaning. The Court held that it was contrary to Articles 43 
EC and 48 EC for Member States to impose certain conditions in domestic company law with 
respect to company formation relating to minimum capital and directors' liability. 
Accordingly, what the Court held was that all attempts of countermeasures to preserve 
national legal capital rules will constitute obstacles to the freedom of establishment.  
                                                 
173 Case C-167/01Inspire Art, para 135. 
174 Case C-167/01Inspire Art, para 141. See also See Kersting & Schindler – The ECJ´s Inspire Art Decision of 
30 September 2003 and its effect on practice, p. 1284, where the authors discuss whether such notice actually 
does make it clear to creditors that foreign law apply to the company. 
175 Case C-167/01Inspire Art, para 136-139.  
176 Case C-167/01Inspire Art, para 140. For a further analysis see Ensig-Sorenson - Centrso Ltd-avgorelsen og 
dens konsekvenser, p.100-102.  This article is interesting since it deals with the present Dutch regulations 
already two years before the ruling of Inspire Art.   
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The holding of the Inspire Art case did not only affect the Netherlands, but also several 
states which were trying to protect their national legislations through counter-measures after 
Centros. For instance, Denmark enacted a new tax legislation as a reaction of the Centros 
case, which would make it more difficult for companies incorporating in Denmark to 
circumvent their legislation. The legislation was, however, even before the Inspire Art case 
strongly criticised by legal writers and regarded not to pass the discrimination and 
proportionality test. As a consequence of the Inspire Art case, it was however later evident 
that such countermeasure was not permissible and the regulations were abolished.177 
 
The holding of the Centros and the Inspire Art case is therefore evident; The only possible 
way of justifying any overriding of the freedom of establishment is if such provisions pursues 
a legitimate aim compatible with the Treaty, is justified by pressing reasons of public interest 
and is of such nature as to ensure achievement of the aim in question and not go beyond what 
is necessary for that purpose.178  Accordingly, as the situation is today, there is no way of 
protecting national interests except for cases of fraud.179 With regards to what was stated in 
part 5.2.3, regarding the conformity between Centros and present European legal capital rules, 
the answer after the Inspire Art case is even more definite. Considering the fact that the Court 
permits circumvention of national rules in favour of the Common Market and dismisses all 
future attempts to protect these rules 180, the two rulings certainly call into question both the 
purpose and the existence of the rules.  
 
5.4 Potential Developments after Centros & Inspire Art 
 
Freedom of establishment is based on the Common Market. One way of interpreting the 
present judgments is therefore that the Common Market, to reach the goals of economic 
growth and integration, requires a European development where companies are able to freely 
establish and freely elect their applicable company law. As a consequence of the feared 
“forum shopping” presented, many scholars furthermore predicted a regulatory competition 
                                                 
177 Trefil – European Company Law: Comments and Meta-Comments on Centros, p.7.  
178 Baelz & Baldwin - The end of The Real Seat Theory, the European Court of Justice Decision in Überseering 
of 5 November 2002 and its Impact on German and European Company Law, p. 8 
179 Kersting & Schindler– The ECJ´s Inspire Art Decision of 30 September 2003 and its effect on practice, p. 
1284.  
180 See Case C-212/97 Centros, para 39 and Case C-167/01Inspire Art, para. 140.  
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between the European states, leading to a “race to the bottom”.181 To prevent this 
development, arguments that Europe should increase its harmonization in the capital area 
even further was called for by several scholars.182 However, today six years have past since 
the Centros decision, and so far no noticeable competition has taken place. Neither has there 
been a radical increase of companies incorporating in the UK trying to circumvent national 
regulations.183 Thus, the by many predicted and feared race to the bottom development has 
demonstrated not to take place in Europe. As a consequence, arguments that Europe should 
extend its harmonization to prevent this development can scarcely be motivated today.   
 
Even though no regulatory competition started in Europe, is may nevertheless be claimed that 
the ECJ rulings have come to call the whole legal capital doctrine into question, see part 5.2.3 
and 5.3.3. It has even been claimed that the Court questions both the purpose and the 
existence of the regime as such. However, the Court did not directly take a position as to the 
usefulness of legal capital in general. Considering the consequences of the rulings, some 
scholars nevertheless saw the rulings as a signal of the fact that Europe had to review its, 
almost holy, legal capital regulations.184 Other scholars, on the other hand, held that legal 
capital rules still had an important role to play in domestic company law, where the rules 
served as creditor protection. In response to this argument, the former scholars, however, have 
put further pressure of changing the current regime by presenting extensive critique and 
arguing that the capital doctrine does not fulfil its objective of protecting creditors. The next 
two chapters will therefore investigate this critique and see whether legal capital rules have a 
role to play in the future.   
 
 
 
                                                 
181The concept of regulatory competition has its origin in the US where the American states compete to have the 
most attractive legislation, to attract as many companies to incorporate as possible. Some scholars have claimed 
that this regulatory competition will lead to a race to the bottom since legislators must adopt as flexible and 
management friendly regulations as possible to attract incorporaters. More on the discussion of a race to the 
bottom in Europe see for example Birkmose-Sondergaars– The Fear of the Delaware-effect – The American 
Demon?, Mock - Harmonization, Regulation and Legislative Competition in European Corporate Law and 
Wymeersch – Centros: A landmark Decision in European Company Law, p. 652.  
182 Baelz & Baldwin, The end of The Real Seat Theory, the European Court of Justice Decision in Überseering of 
5 November 2002 and its Impact on German and European Company Law, p. 8 and See Kersting & Schindler – 
The ECJ´s Inspire Art Decision of 30 September 2003 and its effect on practice, p. 1284, where the authors 
discuss whether such notice actually do make it clear to creditors that foreign law apply to the company. 
183 High Level Company Law Expert’s Report, p. 29  
184 Kübler, The Rules on Capital under the Pressure of the Securities Markets, p. 15.   
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CHAPTER 6  RULES ON LEGAL CAPITAL; PROTECTIVE & 
__________________  _ECONOMICALLY EFFICIENT?____________________                      
 
 
Stimulated by the previous ECJ rulings, and moreover by “Anglo-American wisdom and 
modern economic theory”185 scholars have launched extensive and serious critic in recent 
legal writing, and thereby called the legal capital rules into question. It has been held that the 
current regime is incapable of achieving its objective of protecting creditors, and moreover, 
that it harms enterprisingness.186 The objective of this chapter is hence to review the legal 
capital doctrine as a protector of company creditors to see whether the regime may still be 
justified for this purpose. Moreover, criticism related to the previous rulings and economic 
development within the Common Market will be scrutinized. This thesis does, however, not 
allow for more than a few observations.  
 
6.1 Criticism of Rules on Capital Formation as Creditor Protection 
  
6.1.1 Share Capital Requirements as Creditor Protection are Arbitrary & 
Insufficient … 
The principal criticism made towards the European minimum share capital requirement, is 
that every requirement of a minimum capital requirement will be arbitrary.187 The minimum 
requirement is unrelated to the size of the company, to sort of business activities that a 
company may pursue and to the risks related to that activity. As a consequence, the 
requirement imposed on companies will be unrelated to the debt that a company may incur.188 
This argument must be considered well-founded since the situation where a company that 
transports radioactive waste, has the same minimum share capital requirement as a company 
with little leverage and which designs software, has little connection with real life.189 The 
                                                 
185 Hopt – Modern Company Law Problems; a European Perspective, Keynote Speech, p. 6. 
186 See for example Enriques & Mecey – Creditors versus Capital Formation: The Case Against the European 
Legal Capital Rules, Armour – Share Capital and Creditor Protection: Efficient Rules for a Modern Company 
Law?, Kübler – The Rule on Capital under the Pressure of the Securities Markets, Armour – Share Capital and 
Creditor Protection: Efficient Rules for a Modern Company Law?.  
187 Armour – Share Capital and Creditor Protection: Efficient Rules for a Modern Company Law? p.19. 
188 Kübler – The Rule on Capital under the Pressure of the Securities Markets, p. 5. 
189 Enriques & Mecey – Creditors versus Capital Formation: The Case against the European Legal Capital Rules, 
p. 11. 
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European legal capital model can thus be considered to be un-dynamic and too much of a one-
size-fits-all-rule oriented regime.190   
Since the share capital is arbitrary it will also be insufficient in many situations. Therefore, 
criticism have moreover been put forward that the minimum capital amount required by the 
Second Directive and by Member States is too trivial to provide any protection.191 As a result, 
the cushion in the company will be insufficient in situations of insolvency. For example, 
25,000 euro in a German private GmbH, or 50,000 euro in a German public AG, will scarcely 
be meaningful as creditor protection, in a situation of insolvency, when sales and risk are of 
some significance.192 Accordingly, it may be held that the cushion which the minimum capital 
requirement intends to build up as creditor protection is too small to provide any real 
protection in practice.  
 
6.1.2 …and Misleading if Trusted 
Since the share capital will not provide any meaningful protection for contractual creditors, 
minimum capital requirements are often held to be misleading as an indicator of creditor 
security.193 The legal capital doctrine assumes that the fixed amount of a company’s share 
capital informs current and potential creditors of the recourses that a company possesses and 
may not freely distribute to its shareholders. As been stated before, however, as soon a 
company starts to operate, this capital can be used to purchase assets which later may decline 
in value.194 Since a company may begin to incur losses either in the normal course of 
business, or by entering into unfair transaction, the initial paid-in capital will be a meaningless 
amount. Creditors who wish to inform themselves about a company’s existing equity cushion 
thus must examine the entire balance sheet. Accordingly, it can be held that legal capital rules 
will lull creditors into a false security to the extent that they believe that the legal capital 
legislation will protect them.195  
                                                 
190 Kahan, Legal Capital Rules and the Structure of Corporate Law: Some Observations on the Differences 
between European and US Approaches, p. 147.  
191 Wymeersch,- Some Recent Trends and Developments in Company Law, p.14.   
192 Van der Elst - Analysis of Corporate Law in Europe, p 8 and Andersson - Kapitalkrav och kapitalskydd i 
internationellt perspektiv – onödigt borgenärsskydd?, p. 39. 
193 Andersson - Kapitalkrav och kapitalskydd i internationellt perspektiv – onödigt borgenärsskydd?, p.38. 
194 Armour – Share Capital and Creditor Protection: Efficient Rules for a Modern Company Law?, p.18 and 
Enriques & Mecey– Creditors versus Capital Formation: The Case against the European Legal Capital Rules, p. 
11. 
195 Andersson - Kapitalkrav och kapitalskydd i internationellt perspektiv – onödigt borgenärsskydd?, p.39. 
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In practice, creditors are aware of this misleading balance sheet item and hence do not give 
significant weight to the share capital paid-up in a company.196 More common is instead that 
creditors rely on credit references and/or providing of guarantees.197 This fact has, for 
example, been supported by a number of empirical studies, which have investigated the 
information taken into consideration by sophisticated creditors when making lending 
decisions. Not too astounding, none of the studies found that the share capital was a 
considerable variable for creditors when providing or extending credit. Consequently, as this 
information seem to be of little use to investors, these rules are likely to be inefficient.198  
Even more interesting, and supportive of the argument presented above, is the fact that 
major banks in Germany, who for a long have been defenders of capital rules, have become 
more interested in securities business. Hence, even these banks tend to favour a more market-
orientated corporate system today, where protection is received through contracting. 
Considering this development, some scholars have predicted a “petrification effect”, meaning 
that these market developments may turn out to be stronger than the law and hereby outlive 
the EU Directives.199  
 
6.2 Criticism of a Balance-Sheet Test as Creditor Protection concerning 
Shareholder Distributions 
 
As the rules concerning maintenance of a company’s capital are based on the capital 
formation rules, the arguments of criticism presented above concern also these rules. As it 
may be held that minimum share capital requirements provide no real protection of creditors, 
see previous part, it is difficult for the regulations protecting this cushion to provide any 
extended protection.  
One objection in favour of the European legal capital system must, however, be made. 
When a company operates as a “going concern”, the share capital often amount to a higher 
sum than what is legally required.200 These “higher amounts” are then protected by the 
European principle on the protection of the restricted equity. At least in this way, the 
protection of creditors would be satisfied. However, this argument falls short by the fact that 
                                                 
196 Enriques & Mecey – Creditors versus Capital Formation: The Case against the European Legal Capital Rules, 
p. 11 and Wymeersch,- Some Recent Trends and Developments in Company Law, p.14.   
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198 Armour – Share Capita and Creditor Protection: Efficient Rules for a Modern Company Law?, p.20. 
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the share capital only may amount to a higher sum. The company must, however, not have a 
higher share capital then what is legally required. Considering that most private companies in 
the UK have a share capital of less than £ 100, see part 3.32, and also that the majority of the 
private companies in other Member States have a share capital corresponding to the minimum 
requirements,201 this argument is unfortunately rather vague.  
Criticism has moreover been put forward that the European system, as such, is not an 
efficient and satisfying model of controlling distribution of dividends to shareholders.202 One 
argument considers that systems based on minimum regulations, in general tend to encourage 
different sorts of circumventions and manipulations of the rules.203 Scholars have even held 
that it is part of the “human nature” trying to go around minimum regulations, and the 
classical example is taken from the taxation area where activities of planning to evade the 
rules are common.204 If there is any veracity in this argument, the current European system 
can even be said to encourage accounting measures which are objectively incorrect. For 
example, there is a discussion in many Member States205 whether the gross method (the 
market value) or the net method (the booked value) should be applied when valuating assets, 
as both methods are permissible under the Second Company Law Directive. Hence, as the net 
method is acceptable and used, it can be claimed that there is a contradiction in the system; on 
the one hand, creditor protection is meant to be guaranteed, but on the other hand, companies 
are allowed to underestimate its assets.206      
 
6.3 Does Legal Capital Protect Involuntary Creditors?  
 
The conclusion from the criticism presented above is that contractual creditors regard the 
share capital insufficient and therefore provide themselves with security through various 
contractual arrangements. Involuntary creditors, on the other hand, do not have this possibility 
of contraction, and are thus dependent on the legal capital to cover their claims in Europe.207 
However, not surprisingly, also for these creditors the legal capital rules may be held to not 
provide any meaningful protection208. First of all, as stated, the amount of the minimum 
                                                 
201 Andersson - Kapitalkrav och kapitalskydd i internationellt perspektiv – onödigt borgenärsskydd?, p. 42. 
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capital is both arbitrary and relatively low. Furthermore, little of any legal capital is ever 
likely to be received by involuntary claimants in a process of winding-up or bankruptcy. Such 
parties namely rank as unsecured creditors, and will accordingly be paid only after the 
secured and preferential creditors have had their parts of the company’s assets.209 As a 
consequence, there is typically little or nothing left to the involuntary creditors.210  
However, it may be argued that a minimum capital requirement will provide all creditors 
with at least some protection with regards to the cushion kept in the company, constituting a 
“marginal benefit”211. This argument has, however, been considerably weakened after the 
Centros and the Inspire Art rulings. As mentioned previous, the Court stated that such 
arguments cannot justify rules hindering the freedom of establishment.212 Instead, the Court 
suggested that protection could be accomplished in other ways through law, however, without 
clarifying what it meant. Accordingly, the European system of today cannot be held to 
provide any satisfying protection at all for involuntary creditors.    
 
6.4  Criticism based on Efficiency & Abuse Arguments  
 
6.4.1 Increased Costs on Society  
It has been held above that the minimum capital requirements of the European legislations 
analysed are too low to provide any real security for creditors. However, if the alternative is to 
raise these amounts, many small corporations may be unable to raise the minimum cost and 
thus cannot be formed as limited liability companies.213 For that reason it may be claimed that 
any meaningful initial capital requirement would constitute an obstruction in the formation 
and starting-up of companies. As a result, the whole economic growth would be affected 
negatively if we actually had an efficient share capital. For example, the risk of monopolies 
would increase compared to today as it would be more difficult for new competitors to enter 
the market.214 Considering the aims of the EU and the Common Market, a capital regime 
which increases the possibilities of more monopolies being created must clearly be regarded 
contradictory to any market economy.  
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One of the objectives of a requiring an initial capital, is also to prevent small companies 
from forming with a shareholder objective of abusing the limited liability. There is also some 
evidence that the absence of share capital will reflect a higher propensity of companies 
becoming insolvent.215 In accordance with this evidence, it could thus be argued that if we 
were to have legal capital rules, these would be applicable to the smallest firms, and the larger 
firms would be exempted under this hypothesis. Interestingly, at present the Second EU 
Directive requires exactly the opposite.      
 
6.4.2 Bureaucracy and Increased Costs on Companies 
In addition to the criticism mentioned above, legal capital regulations have moreover been 
argued to impose costs on companies. First, it is often held that rules on capital formation will 
slow down the process of forming companies.216 This is particularly obvious with respect to 
contributions in kind which must be valued by an independent expert before incorporation. 
Such procedure is both cumbersome and expensive for companies as it involves significant 
administrative costs and requires much time spent on issues that may be seen as 
bureaucracy.217 Moreover, in some cases this procedure is held to not even add any value for 
either the incorporation process or to the creditors. 218 This is especially the case if the assets 
contributed have been fully and effectively valuated at regular market price, for instance when 
listed or regulatory trade securities are being contributed.219 In this area there are however 
some changes to come in a near future, see chapter 7.   
Moreover, the prohibition of the Second Directive against contributions in exchange for 
future services has also been claimed to reduce the flexibility of companies. In the new 
economy, ideas are increasingly considered to be worth more than physical assets, and 
competitors hence strive to retain the best minds.220 As a consequence it may be claimed that 
the prohibition of services as contributions in kind, may generate problems for the start-up 
                                                 
215 Wymeersch- Some Recent Trends and Developments in Company Law, p.14.   
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financing of, for example, high-tech companies or companies specialized in providing 
services. In such companies a significant part of the assets will comprise of “brain-power”, 
which under current system is not legally regarded as assets. Thus it may be argued, that the 
prohibition of providing services, is a brake in the economic growth of the Common Market. 
These regulations may, however, be subject to change in the near future, see part 7.3.  
In accordance with this flexibility argument, the present debate has also pointed at the 
increased flexibility that could be achieved if more convergence was to be achieved in the 
regulatory requirements of the world, first and foremost with respect to the US. This 
convergence would benefit especially larger companies since these operate over boarders 
more than ever today.221  
   
 
The purpose of this chapter was of course not to demonstrate that Europe should abandon 
legal capital rules at once and let market forces run freely. There is nothing in this chapter 
advocating that Europe should adapt a US or similar system. Rather, the point was to 
highlight that our system is not perfect, and that we therefore have reasons to become aware 
of these. Only when we are aware of the disadvantages we can change these to the better. As 
the criticism reviles, and to a certain extent also the presented ECJ rulings, there is pressure 
on the current legal capital rules of adapting to the economic system and business methods 
predominant today.      
Accordingly, what I am advocating is that Europe should jettison the regulations that are 
based on antiquated notions, in favour of a more efficient and up to date regime. Values and 
traditions are important notions that should be respected, but to base the capital regulations on 
such conservative arguments222 is, according to me, not sustainable. Consequently, it can be 
claimed that there are more efficient ways of protecting creditors and at the same time provide 
more efficient rules for companies. Statements like this, however, automatically give raise to 
another question; how will an “efficient” and “up to date” European regime be drafted? 
Should we blindly follow other systems or should we seek our own ways? This issue has 
become more interesting than ever after the launch of a report, issued by the EU Commission, 
on the modernising of EU company law.  
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CHAPTER 7 FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL CAPITAL 
___________________  REGIME IN EUROPE_____________________________ 
 
As been illustrated by the previous chapters, many scholars and business actors agree that 
company law has not kept up with recent developments, in particular with respect to the 
Common EU Market which companies wish to use to the optimum. Company law must hence 
catch up with these developments to provide a modern regulatory framework within the EU 
for company law. This is, however, not to ignore that proper protection of creditors is an 
integral part of this development. Such protection will be necessary to reduce the risk and 
costs so that creditors are willing to lend money and extend credit. Under these assumptions, 
the EU Commission initiated an investigation to provide the EU with a modern, competitive 
and efficient company law.   
 
7.1 SLIM and the High Level Group Report 
 
In 1996 the European Commission launched a project to modernise and simplify key 
Common Market legislation. The program was named SLIM (Simpler Legislation for the 
Common Market) and comprised 17 different legislative key sectors.223 One of these key 
sectors to analyze was the company law sector, and thus a SLIM working party was set up for 
this purpose.224 The objective of the working party was to identify whether a simpler 
legislation could replace the existing one in the field the First and the Second Company Law 
Directive.225 The working party submitted a number of proposals, of which, with regards to 
this essay, the most interesting was to eliminate the need for an expert’s valuation report 
where contributions consisted of securities traded in a regulated marked. (To review the 
further proposals of the SLIM working party, see reference in footnote 226.226)  
 
Though the SLIM proposals were presented to the Commission already in 1999, no further 
action was taken during some years. In September 2001, however, the Commission set up a 
new group to continue and complete the SLIM project. This group comprised of seven 
                                                 
223 European Company Law: The “Simple Legislation for the Common Market” (SLIM) Initiative of the EU 
Commission, p. 1. 
224 The working party was composed of officials of the state administrations, company law practioners and 
academics, under guidance of Chairman Eddy Wymeersch.  
225 SLIM Report, p. 1 + 4.  
226 See the complete list of the SLIM proposals at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/official/6037en.pdf  
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company law experts227, and worked under the name The Group of High Level Company Law 
Experts (also called the “Winter Group” after the chairman of the group Jaap Winter). The 
areas covered by the project were corporate governance, groups and pyramids, corporate 
restructuring and mobility, the European Company and capital formation and maintenance, 
the latter to be scrutinized here.228  
The Winter Group was given the objective of initiating a discussion on the need for 
modernisation of company law in Europe, in light of the previous SLIM report.229 For that 
purpose the Group in April 2002 launched a consultation document on possible approaches to 
reform company law in Europe. In the consultative document the Group invited all parties 
interested in, and concerned with, company law in Europe to comment on the issues discussed 
in the document.230 Based on these consultations, over 2500 pages of response and comments, 
the High Level Group in November 2002, presented the final “Report of the High Level 
Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in 
Europe”231  to the EU Commission. In the report the Group initiated what it believed to be the 
most important priorities for the EU on the short, medium and long perspective, and moreover 
made recommendations with respect to these priorities.232  
 
     7.2 Consultations Revealing Dissatisfaction of the System  
 
As stated, the Winter Group worked on the basis of a consultation document, and eleven 
questions were consulted with respect to capital formation and maintenance rules233. The 
findings from the consultation were rather remarkable. First of all, only 25 % of the 
respondents firmly believed in the current legal capital system and regarded that the legal 
capital served a function as creditor protection. The majority, however, 68 %, of the 
                                                 
227 The company law experts comprised of: Chairman Jaap Winter, Klaus J. Hopt, Jonathan Richford, Guido 
Rossi, Jan Schans Christensen and Joelle Simon. Rapporteur was Dominique Thienpont and Karel Van Hulle 
was Secretariat.  
228 “Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework for Company 
Law in Europe”, presented to the European Commission on the 4th November 2002, p. 27. Below called the 
“Report”  
229 Andersson– The High Level Group and the Issue of European Company Law Harmonization – Europe 
Stumbles Along? p. 183. 
230 Andersson– The High Level Group and the Issue of European Company Law Harmonization – Europe 
Stumbles Along? p. 184. 
231 See the Report at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/modern/consult/report_en.pdf 
232 Von Hulle – Does the EU have a Role to Play in Company Law? p. 30. 
233 Anex 3 of the Report, p. 147.  
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respondents did not believe that the legal capital served this function.234 The share capital 
amount stated in the articles of association was instead considered to be a primitive and 
inaccurate indication of a company’s ability to pay its debts and there was a wide agreement 
that the concept of legal capital was not effective in attaining the objectives that were assigned 
to it.235  Most respondents therefore held that there was room for improvement of the current 
regime and that a more flexible regulation was needed. As a consequence of this critique, 73% 
stated in their answers that they considered there to be other possibilities of reaching the same 
objectives by means of other techniques than legal capital. 236 Only 10 % of the respondents 
held that there was no need for a new approach.237 
 
Three alternative approaches to reform were presented by the Group in the consultation 
document and subsequently considered by the interest groups participating. The first 
alternative presented was based on the previous SLIM proposals and represented the least 
radical change. This approach did not imply a radical departure from the current system in 
Europe, instead it may be seen as an evolution of the current regime to a more simplified and 
modern capital regime.238 This first alternative was supported by 45 % of the respondents and 
is scrutinized under part 7.1.2.239 The second approach was much more radical and more or 
less based on the experience of US jurisdictions. This approach would imply nearly 
revolutionary changes from the Europe perspective if it were to be implemented, and was only 
supported by 9% of the respondents.240 This approach will therefore not be further discussed.  
Lastly, a third approach was contemplated which may be considered as something in 
between the other two alternatives, and which was supported by 26 % of the respondents.241 
As the US approach, this alternative was also based on the elimination of the concept of legal 
capital, but which seek to integrate that fundamental change with some of the basic features of 
European company law. Accordingly, this approach would not copy a US capital regime, but 
                                                 
234 Anex 3 of the Report, p. 147. 
235 Report, p. 78. 
236 Anex 3 of the Report, p. 148.  
237 Anex 3 of the Report, p. 148. Although the harsh critic of the current capital system, it is worth noticing that a 
small majority, 54 %, did not consider that European companies were at a disadvantage of attracting investors, 
compared to companies subjects under different capital systems. However, half of the negative responses came 
from German respondents. Of the persons that thought that European companies were at a disadvantage (46 %), 
blamed this on the restrictive charters and complexity of the system, in particular with regards to the regulations 
concerning contributions in kind and the weak capital protection. None of the respondents argue that European 
companies enjoy an advantage thanks to the legal capital regime existing within the EU. See the Report p. 78-79. 
and Anex 3 of the Report, p, 149. 
238 Report, p. 79-80.  
239 Anex 3 of the Report, p. 148. 
240 Report, p. 80 and Anex 3 of the Report, p. 148. 
241 Anex 3 of the Report, p. 148. 
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instead rebuild the regime from a European point of view, making use of some ideas coming 
from the US experience but also from other legal systems242 (see part 7.1.3). Taking into 
consideration the consultation results, the Winter Group made two important 
recommendations. 
  
7.3 First recommendation; Amendment of the Second Company Law Directive 
 
The first recommendation from the Group was put forward as a matter of priority. This 
recommendation was based on the first approach mentioned in the previous paragraph, and 
implied that the Commission should present a number of proposals to reform the Second 
Company Law Directive. This reform would follow the proposals suggested by the SLIM 
working party, but also further modifications and supplementary proposals which were made 
by the Group in what was called the SLIM-plus Report.243  
Under the SLIM-plus approach, the concept of legal capital was recommended to remain 
as the basis together with other fundamental European legal capital features. The minimum 
share capital requirement would remain in present form, even though the Group stated that the 
only function it served was to deter individuals from light-heartedly starting a public limited 
company.244 However, in accordance with what the SLIM working party proposed, the Winter 
Group recommended the elimination of expert’s valuation reports of non-cash contributions 
since these were regarded to be expensive and not able to offer a total guarantee of the assets´ 
real value. This abolition was recommended to apply when (1) contribution consists of 
securities traded in a regulated market and there is a market price, (2) where there is a recent 
evaluation and there are no new qualifying circumstances that need to be taken into account 
and (3) where values derive from audited accounts provided that the accounting principles 
used are still applicable to the assets.245  
Furthermore, the Group examined the possibilities of allowing services as contributions in 
kind. In accordance with the consultation results246, the Group regarded this institute to be 
decisive to, for example start-up companies, technological companies or professional 
companies specialised in services, see part 6.4.2. As a result, the Group commended the 
                                                 
242 Report, p. 80. 
243 Report, p. 81. 
244 Report, p. 82. 
245 Report, p. 83.  
246 Anex 3 of the Report, p. 150. 
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Commission to review the possibility of allowing services as contribution in kind in the 
revision of the Second Directive.247 
 
The presented consultations clearly demonstrate the fact that there is a pressure of reviewing 
the current legal capital regulations. This first recommendation of change can be held to be a 
step in the right direction of a more efficient regime, at least with regards to business activity.  
At the same time, the method recommended may prove to be treacherous. Basically what is 
recommended in this first proposal is that the traditional European legal capital system is 
retained while details, from mainly the US system, are being incorporated. Both regulations 
regarding services in kind and the notion of not requiring expert valuation reports are features 
of a system which not is built up around creating a cushion in the company. The consequence 
may therefore be that these incorporated details will be picked without consideration of their 
context and regulations existing to “back them up”, when placed in our system. The 
regulations incorporated are clearly shareholder friendly, but no changes are made as to make 
the creditor protection more effective. (Involuntary) creditors, still only have the 
“insufficient” share capital to rely on. The point thus is, that to create an efficient and 
complete model the whole system must be coherent; every rule must be based on a previous 
to complete each other. However, all in all, it must be regarded that this first recommendation 
to the Commission will be a positive development for European company law, when 
implemented.   
 
7.4 Second recommendation; Development of an Alternative Regime 
 
On basis of the consultations the Group observed that the criticism directed at the current 
regime was both fundamental and serious. Therefore, it was considered necessary to create a 
new approach which abandoned the current legal capital regime, but which at the same time 
fit in the European company law structure.248 A second recommendation of the Group was 
therefore that the Commission, at a later stage, should conduct a review into the achievability 
of an alternative regime, based on more modern solutions for creditor protection.249 This 
regime would be based on the third approach presented in the consultation document, see part 
                                                 
247 Report, p. 83. Numerous more recommendations were moreover made, for example concerning pre-emption 
rights, capital reduction and financial assistance. See the complete report and all recommendations made at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/modern/consult/report_en.pdf 
248 Report, p. 81+86.  
249 Report, p. 86-87.  
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7.1.1. The idea of this alternative approach was not to replace the capital formation and 
maintenance rules of the Second Directive, as amended according to the SLIM-plus 
proposals. Rather, this new regime was suggested to be offered as an alternative option. 
Member States should be able to decide whether to impose the alternative regime or to retain 
requirements of the Second Directive.250  
Under the recommended alternative approach, the share capital requirement would be fully 
abolished. Creditor protection would instead come by means of a solvency test, which would 
be applied to all distributions of capital.251 The Group held that this method had all potential 
to be at least as effective, even superior, in achieving the objectives of creditor protection as 
the current regime based on legal capital.252 As an argument, the Group stated that creditors 
would be better protected if an adequate solvency test was developed, since under the present 
system there are possibilities that solvent companies are unable to make distributions which 
clearly harm creditors. Also controversially, there are possibilities under the current system 
that insolvent companies are able to make distributions, which would be prevented if an 
adequate solvency test was developed.253  
 
Considering the critique presented towards the first recommendation of the Group, this second 
recommendation clearly views the recommended approach as an entirety, building up the 
regime from the start. Though the Group does not deal with this alternative model in detail, 
but refers to coming investigations, it has all the potential to become a complete and coherent 
system. Personally, I believe that the idea of a European solvency test regime can provide 
both a more flexible system, and at the same time attain a better creditor protection.  
     First of all, with regards to contractual creditors, their way of acting would not drastically 
differ from today since contractual creditors already manage their own risk by insisting on 
contracts. Instead, the recommended approach regards creditors more individually and would 
accordingly conform better to the existing reality. It could of course be argued that a 
mandatory legal regime may save the parties from extensive contracting. This argument is, 
however, only persuasive as long as it can be assumed that the legal capital regime in fact is 
able to grant creditors satisfactory amount of certainty that they will be repaid out of corporate 
funds.254 As stated in part 6.1, this is not the situation under the current system.  
                                                 
250 Report, p. 87. 
251 Report, p. 87-88. 
252 Report p. 87. 
253 Report p. 87. 
254 Kübler – The Rule on Capital under the Pressure of the Securities Markets, p. 9. 
Legal Capital, Creditor Protection & Efficiency?                                                      Sandra Ax 
 58
Furthermore, this alternative regime can be seen to be in conformity with the recent 
development of new and more sophisticated instruments to protect creditors contractually. For 
example, banks constantly refine the use of receivables as collateral, and there are moreover 
many contractual forms – sureties, guarantees, standby letters of credit, performance bonds- 
which allow shifting liability back to the shareholders.255 As been stated previous, this 
argument holds true even for actors whom traditionally have defended the legal capital 
system, for instance German banks.256 These new opportunities have in several ways 
contributed to the erosion of the capital regime. Moreover, their proliferation demonstrates 
that creditors have lost confidence in being protected by rules on capital. At the same time 
they provide a better protection by enabling creditors to seek satisfaction from specific assets. 
This situation, however, imply that these assets are no longer available for protection of the 
other creditors. Accordingly, this situation obviously increases the problem for involuntary 
creditors as they are unable to rely on any form of contracting.257    
Even though the issue of involuntary creditors was not directly addressed in the Report, the 
Group suggested two ways in which a solvency test could offer also these non-contractual 
creditors a stronger protection compared to, for example, the US model. First, the Group 
suggested that it might be considered whether there should be a certain solvency margin, 
meaning that a company distributing dividends must have assets exceeding its liabilities by at 
least a certain percentage.258 Adapting such solvency margin, would, according to me, offer a 
proper mechanism to integrate legal and statutory reserves into a regime where there is no 
legal capital.  
Second, and as a further protection, the Group suggests that on the basis of the solvency 
test recommended, the directors would have to issue a solvency certificate, which would 
contain an explicit confirmation that the proposed distributions meet the solvency test. A valid 
distribution could thus be made only when such certificate is issued. It was moreover 
suggested, that directors should be responsible for the correctness of this solvency certificate, 
and that Member States should impose proper sanctions if the certificate was proven to be 
misleading.259 In addition to what the Winter Group has recommended, alternatives based on 
mandatory insurances might furthermore be regarded to avoid an extended use of the piercing 
of the corporate veil doctrine. Such alternative might, for example, have been what the ECJ 
                                                 
255 Kübler – The Rule on Capital under the Pressure of the Securities Markets, p. 13. 
256 See part 6.1.2. 
257 Kübler – The Rule on Capital under the Pressure of the Securities Markets, p. 13. 
258 Report, p. 88.  
259 Report, p. 88.  
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considered in both the Centros and the Inspire Art Case when it stated that public creditors, 
i.e. involuntary creditors, could be protected by law, see part 5.2.2. 260  
 
The recommended approach was not dealt with in detail by the Group since the Group 
concluded that further studies had to be made in order to develop and adopt this solvency 
test.261 However, in accordance with the recommendations made, the Group advised the 
Commission to set up an Action Plan to move forward with the objective of modernizing 
European company law. 
 
7.5 “Action Plan to move Forward”; Where will, where should Europe 
Go? 
 
In May 2003 the EU Commission gave its response to the High Level Group 
recommendations and presented a report on “A Plan to Move Forward”262. In this report, the 
Commission stated that it intends to adopt the recommendations from the High Level Group 
on simplifying the Second Directive on the basis of the SLIM-plus approach. Accordingly, 
expert valuations regarding contributions in kind will be abandoned in defined circumstances, 
see part 7.3, and the Commission intends to implement these recommendations as soon as 
possible with the deadline running out in 2005.263  
In addition, the Commission also announced the launch of a study into the feasibility of an 
alternative regime to the legal capital regime. Exactly how this alternative regime will be 
drafted, and when it will come into force, is thus so far only subject of speculations. Even if 
an alternative regime will be drafted may be subject to speculations. The issue of changing the 
legal capital doctrine is namely not only changing the “black letter rules”264, traditions must 
also be changed. Regards must be taken to the fact that these rules have been cornerstones in 
European company law for a long time. Furthermore, politics play an important role even 
when legal decisions are made, especially within the EU. Company law may be considered to 
be only one piece in a larger game. When the final decisions are taken there will be log-
                                                 
260 See Case 212/97 Centros Case para 37. See also Kübler – The Rule on Capital under the Pressure of the 
Securities Markets, p. 13.  
261 Report p. 88.  
262 “Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union –A Plan to Move 
Forward”.  
 263 Von Hulle – Does the EU have a Role to Play in Company Law?, p. 30+34, and Modernising Company Law 
and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union – A Plan to Move Forward, p. 18.  
264 Metaphor for the written text in a statue.  
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rolling and trade offs between the Member States. The important thing is, however, that 
initiatives are taken and that the system do not remain as is has always been just because “that 
is the way it has always been”. If an alternative regime was adopted, not only company law 
would develop but also the European commercial life. Accordingly it will be interesting to 
follow the development to come and to see which Member States that will adopt potential 
new regime.  
 
What about private companies? These are not subject under any harmonization requirements 
and the national rules regarding these companies are free for Member Sates of changing 
already today, or? Well, it is true that the Second Directive only concerns public companies. 
The development of public companies may, however, be claimed to be most relevant, even 
decisive, also for private companies. Since Member States are obliged to follow the Second 
Directive, they have also built up other statutory rules, for example bankruptcy law, around 
the notion of legal capital. Even in the UK, where private companies drastically differ from 
remaining European states, the company structure can be held to be built up around a legal 
capital as distributions to shareholders may not be made if these would trespass the share 
capital. Accordingly, also private companies will follow requirements applicable to public 
companies. Consequently, it may therefore be claimed that a prerequisite of changing national 
rules regarding private companies, is that the mandatory regulations concerning public 
companies are changed.  
Today most limited liability companies are private companies. Considering this fact it is 
therefore more important than ever that EU company law is effective. As it may be held that 
EU company law has not kept up with recent developments in other closely related areas, see 
chapter 6, it is time to remedy this defect. This development is not only necessary to provide 
creditors satisfactory protection but also if the EU will be able to live up to its aims of stabile 
economic growth within the Common Market. Whatever the outcome of the discussions 
presented above will be, the usefulness of the legal capital itself will continue to be contested, 
and it will be most interesting to follow the ongoing debate and development within Europe in 
the nearest future. 
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CHAPTER 8  CONCLUSION AND FINAL COMMENTS____________  
 
 
The European legal capital rules were adopted in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Since then, the rules have become firmly rooted in European company laws, EU Directives 
and even in traditions. However, in roughly 150 years society changes, and along with it 
business conduct and conditions of running a company changes. Ever since the creation of the 
EU, states within the Union has been involved in an extensive economic integration. As from 
the adoption of the Single European Act, and the establishment of the Common Market, this 
development has become even more obvious as Europe has faced a rapidly growing economy. 
The objective of this thesis has been to illustrate how this development has come to interfere 
in, and challenge, traditional national and EU legal capital regulations.  
 
Primarily this interference has been illustrated through the acknowledgement of a right for 
companies to freely establish within the Union. This freedom of establishment has been 
guaranteed in the EC Treaty as an instrument of achieving the EU goals of economic growth 
and integration within the Common Market. The consequence of providing such 
establishment, however, has been that national legal capital rules protecting creditors have 
been possible to circumvent. Most Member States were traumatized by this development 
which has come to turn national rules into non-applicable words, with respect to foreign 
companies establishing within their territory. To protect national rules on capital counter-
measures were therefore taken, but also these were regarded to be contrasting to EU goals and 
could hence not be upheld. As a consequence of this development, this thesis has raised the 
question whether rules on capital are compatible with the goals of the EU. In response it has 
been argued that it would be taking conclusions too far claiming that legal capital rules are 
contrary to EU goals. However, it must be held that both the purpose and the existence of the 
current legal capital regime have been called into question.  
 
Bearing in mind the consequences of the ECJ rulings and the development of the common 
Market, some scholars have regarded these circumstances as a signal of the fact that Europe 
should review its rules on capital. These pleaders have even further highlighted that the 
current regulations may not be justified as effective in achieving their objective, to protect 
creditors. Both legal and economic actors have thus held that the regulations are both arbitrary 
and insufficient, and thus also misleading instead of protecting for creditors relying on them. 
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Moreover, and contrasting to Common Market goals, the rules are considered inflexible and 
cumbersome as they impose cost on both companies and the society as a whole. As a 
consequence, this thesis therefore argue that Europe should review its legal capital regulations 
and jettison rules that are based on antiquated notions, in favour of a more efficient and up to 
date regime. Nevertheless, values and traditions are important factors to consider, although 
this thesis regards it not to be sustainable to base capital regulations on such conservative 
arguments.  
 
As a consequence of the present EU development and the presented criticism, the thesis 
moreover examined the future of the legal capital doctrine. Primarily, the recommendations in 
the High Level Group of Company Law Expert’s report on modernising European company 
law were considered. The examination report reviles that a remarkably little group of interest 
organizations and parties believe in the current system, merely 25 %. In addition, nearly 75 % 
regard that there are other ways of achieving the same objectives as under the current system. 
Considering these results, the thesis hence regards that the pressure of reviewing the present 
regulations is both evident and urgent.  
 
The recommendations of the High Level Group, presented to the EU Commission, were 
primarily two with regards to legal capital regulations. First some amendments of the Second 
Directive concerning contributions in kind were made. These recommendations may be seen 
as a first step of adjusting the current regime to provide more efficient and enterprising 
regulations, in conformity with the Common Market. The amendments will be adopted by the 
Commission before the expiration of 2005. In its second recommendation the Group request 
the Commission to initiate an investigation to the feasibility of an “alternative regime” to the 
Second Directive, based on creditor protection through a solvency test. The thesis concludes 
that such regime would constitute a more modern and efficient approach than the current, 
while at the same time being in conformity with values of creditor protection and goals of a 
Common Market. Moreover, such alternative regime may be regarded to constitute a balanced 
solution, bearing in mind the status of the legal capital doctrine as deeply rooted tradition. 
Changing rules on capital into a solvency test approach, would in some Member States, based 
on the strict German regulations, imply nearly revolutionary adjustments. Through the 
solution of an alternative regime, however, Member States can amend their legislations when 
they consider them to be ready, or they do not have to change at all. Nevertheless, the 
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important thing is that there are other possibilities which conform better to currant economic 
life and development.  
 
Summarily, the current and ongoing development within the EU clearly denotes a distinct 
shift from the approach taken in the Member States today with respect to legal capital rules. 
To fulfil EU goals, and at the same time safeguard national interest of creditor protection, new 
ideas should be considered. This is however not to say that Europe should adapt a shareholder 
perspective similar to the prevailing in the US. Contrarily, the point made is, that there are 
other more effective ways of protecting creditors and at the same achieving more flexible and 
effective regulations, all within our European values. It is necessary for Europe to open up 
their eyes and not blink the fact that there are new solutions when the present are not 
effective.  However, how such system will be drafted, as an alternative regime or perhaps as a 
model act, only the future can answer.  
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